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DEPROGRAVMNG MEMBERS OF
RELIGIOUS SECTS
JOHN E. LeMOULT*
I. INTRODUCTION
T he conflict between established cultures and new religions is an
ancient one. It is parallel to and part of the conflict of the
generations, the parent-child struggle, youth's quest for identity
through conversion, and age's need to preserve meaning and purpose
through established values. It is also part of the ongoing friction
between established socio-political institutions and the new ideas that
transform those institutions.
In times past, society's intolerance of new religions was easily
implemented. Early Christians were crucified. Later, members of
Christian sects perceived as heretical were burned at the stake, or
tortured into submission. Puritans were harried out of England. Quak-
ers, Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, Black Muslims, and many others
have suffered different forms of religious persecution in America. It is
nothing new. I
What is new is the way some members of modern society have
chosen-in a supposedly enlightened age of first amendment religious
freedom-to fight new religious ideas. It is called "deprograinming." It
consists of taking adherents of religious groups against their wills,
confining them, and subjecting them to intense mental, emotional, and
sometimes physical pressures until they renounce their religious
affiliation.2 Deprogramming raises profound questions about religious
liberty, privacy, and freedom from parental control. The courts and
legislatures are just beginning to deal with these questions. This
Article will attempt to discuss some of the background factors in-
volved, as well as recent developments in the law.
In order to understand the legal issues surrounding deprogramming,
it is necessary to take a look at new religious movements and sects, as
well as at "deprogrammers" and the methods they employ. This Article
will consider: 1) the current "high demand" religious groups, and their
process of conversion; 2) the deprogrammers and their techniques of
behavior modification; 3) the constitutional rights of members of
religious sects; 4) the constitutional rights of minors; 5) the legality of
* A.B., Xavier University-, LL.B., Fordham University. Mr. LeMoult is a member of the law
firm of Karpatkin, Pollet & LeMoulL
1. See generally W. Marnell, The First Amendment 1-48 (1964); L. Pfeffer, Church. State, and
Freedom 6-27 (1953).
2. See notes 30-43 infra and accompanying text.
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abduction and restraint for the purpose of deprogramming; 6) the use
of conservatorship proceedings for the purpose of accomplishing de-
programming; and 7) civil suits, a counterattack by targets of depro-
gramming.
II. BACKGROUND
A. New Religious Sects
The emergence of new religious sects in America attracting thou-
sands of young adherents every year3 would lead one to believe we are
undergoing a religious revival. But this is probably not true. There
have always been new religious sects, and the diversity in beliefs of the
new groups makes the concept of a unified "revival" unlikely. What is
probably happening is that middle class young people are beginning to
move away from established churches to unorthodox high demand, 4
often authoritarian, sects springing up all over the country. 5
Fundamentalist, evangelical, pentecostal, or charismatic sects which
for decades have practiced "born again" Christianity in Southern
Baptist churches, among "Holy Rollers," in black rural churches, and
in the faith healing hills of Bible Belt America are now attracting the
college educated children of suburban Catholics, Protestants, and
Jews. 6 Likewise, the practices of Zen Buddhism, Yoga, Hindu chant-
ing, Transcendental Meditation, Sufi dancing, and Sikh vegetarianism
which formerly attracted only a few western urban intellectuals, are
now attracting the sons and daughters of Scarsdale, Oak Park, Shaker
Heights, and Grosse Point. 7
The reasons for this shift of middle class youth away from estab-
lished churches to these new sects are too complex to discuss
thoroughly here. Certainly there is a need for an inner-directed, more
authoritarian, and less social-conscious Christianity.8 But the move of
3. Gordon, The Kids and the Cults, Children Today, July/Aug. 1977, at 24, 24.
4. Dean Kelley describes high demand religions, where the ordinary members make substantial
commitments of time and energy to their faith, rather than just attending services once a week or on
special occasions, in D. Kelley, Why Conservative Churches Are Growing 47-5 (Harper & Row ed.
1977).
5. Id. at 20-27; see Black, The Secrets of the Innocents: Why Kids Join Cults, Woman's Day,
Feb. 1977, at 91, 166; Gordon, The Kids and the Cults, Children Today, July/Aug. 1977, at 24, 24.
6. H. Cox, Turning East 93-95 (1977); see B. Graham, The Jesus Generation 14-16 (1971);
Religion: The New Rebel Cry: Jesus is Coming!, Time, June 27, 1971, at 56. See generally Briggs,
Report Finds Evangelical Churches Continue To Grow as Others Decline, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29,
1977, at A14, col. 1.
7. See, e.g., H. Cox, Turning East 7-21 (1977); Briggs, D.spite Rigors, Buddhism Continues To
Win Adherents in U.S., N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1976, at 35, col. 1; Religion: Yogi Bhajan's Synthetic
Sikhism, Time, Sept. 5, 1977, at 70;Behavior: The TM Craze: FortyMinutes toBliss, Time, Oct. 13,
1975, at 71; Religion: The Power of Positive Non-Thinking. Newsweek, Jan. 7, 1974, at 73.
8. See D. Kelley, Why Conservative Churches Are Growing (Harper & Row ed. 1977).
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many young people away from Christianity and Judaism toward such
groups as the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, the
Divine Light Mission of Maharaj Ji, and many other eastern religions
of a communal type suggests that they are looking for companionship,
a sense of participation, a direct experience, a return to nature, and
authority that they have not found in their established religions. 9 Now
that the political and social battles of the civil rights and antiwar
movements have died down, young people searching for absolute
answers are investing their energy and commitment in religions.
Deprogrammers and some parents are convinced that all of these
new sects are part of a mass conspiracy (sometimes said to be Com-
munist 0 ) to brainwash young people" and turn them into "zombies."
The deprogrammers lump all different kinds of groups together,
making no effort to differentiate the beliefs or practices of the many
disparate groups. 12 The charge is made that the new groups have
psychologically kidnaped their new devotees, depriving them of their
free will,1 3 so that only the most drastic measures can "rescue" them
from this bondage. 14
The measures employed by deprogrammers include kidnaping, phys-
ical restraint, and enforced behavior modification or "brainwashing" of
the very kind they accuse religious sects of practicing.15 Deprogram-
mers justify these methods on the theory that the young people are
"programmed" by the "cults," and that all the deprogrammers are
doing is bringing them back to reality. 16
Parents are disturbed not only by the new theological beliefs of their
offspring, but also, and perhaps more so, by the changes in their
attitudes and appearances. Pot-smoking, motorcycle-riding kids be-
come serene quoters of Scripture or oriental tracts. Young people doff
sweaters, sneakers, and blue jeans for ties, jackets, long skirts, or
flowing saffron robes. '7 Parents assume their once normal offspring
have lost their minds, been "brainwashed."' 8 But what has clearly
9. See H. Cox, Turning East 91-110 (1977).
10. Religion: Kidnaping for Christ, Time, Mar. 12, 1973, at 83, 84.
11. See, e.g., Ericson & MacPherson,How Free Should Religious Freedom Be? Are the Children
of God Brainwashed?, Christian Herald, Oct. 1973, at 32; Perlez, Is It a Kidnap or Is It a Rescue?,
N.Y. Post, Mar. 5, 1973, at 57, col. 1.
12. E.g., T. Patrick with T. Dulack, Let Our Children Go! 20, 281 (1976).
13. Id. at 75-76.
14. See Religion: DefreakingJesus Freaks, Newsweek, Mar. 12, 1973, at 44.
15. E.g., T. Patrick with T. Dulack, Let Our Children Go! 63 (1976);see notes 32-43. 60-67 infra
and accompanying text.
16. E.g., T. Patrick with T. Dulack, Let Our Children Go! 67-68, 76-77 (1976).
17. See, e.g., id. at 43, 107, 118; Clines, About New York: Religious Freedom vs. Parental Care,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1976, at 78, col. 1.
18. E.g., Religion: The Freedom To Be Strange, Time, Mar. 28, 1977, at 81. One possible
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happened is that the young people have undergone a thing called
conversion. 19
To most Christian groups, conversion is a sudden infusion of grace
into the soul, a new birth, accepting Jesus as one's personal Savior.20
To eastern religions, it is a slower opening to the awareness of God
within oneself, or the universal Self or Soul or Consciousness underly-
ing all Being. It is acheived through chanting, yoga, or some form of
meditation, and through the abandonment of the lower self (the ego
with its base desires). By means of detachment, one attains a higher
state of enlightenment and oneness with the essence of the world
around him. 21
The conversion experience has been well described by William
James in The Varieties of Religious Experience.22 He considers it a
crystallizing of unconscious aims and wishes, previously "incubated" in
"cold" centers of the mind, and suddenly becoming "hot"-brought to
the surface by some crisis or experience and occupying the center of
one's thoughts and activities. 23 James says this happens particularly to
people in their teens, and that certain psychological and emotional
changes are characteristic of all conversions. 24 The fact that a dra-
matic change takes place in a converted youth is neither new nor
sinister. It may simply be a case of arriving at a new identity, perhaps
a "negative identity" with respect to the role offered as proper and
desirable in one's family. 25
No one has proved that any religious sect which has been the target
explanation for parents' opposition to new religious sects may be the rejection of materialistic values
by some of these sects. In this success and status oriented society, the true religion is often tile
acquisition of money, material goods, and power. Religions that eschew such goals attack tile
most dearly held values of the depression era generation and hit a raw nerve of hostility.
19. See Kelley, Deprogramming and Religious Liberty, Civil Liberties Review 23, 28-29 (July/
Aug. 1977).
20. See, e.g., C. Colson, Born Again 110, 130 (Spire ed. 1977); B. Graham, How To Be Born
Again 154-69 (1977).
21. See, e.g., C. Humphreys, The Buddhist Way of Life 111-22 (1969).
22. W. James, The Varieties of Religious Experience 157-206 (New American Library ed
1958).
23. Id. at 161-62, 186-87; see id. at 157-206.
24. "The age is the same, falling usually between fourteen and seventeen. The symptoms are the
same,--sense of incompleteness and imperfection; brooding, depression, morbid introspection, and
sense of sin; anxiety about the hereafter; distress over doubts, and the like. And the result is the
same,-a happy relief and objectivity, as the confidence in self gets greater through the adjustment of
the faculties to the wider outlook. In spontaneous religious awakening, apart from revivalistic
examples, and in the ordinary storm and stress and moulting-time of adolescence, we also may meet
with mystical experiences, astonishing the subjects by their suddenness, just as in revivalistic
conversion." Id. at 164.
25. See E. Erikson, Identity 172-73,(1968).
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of deprogramming engages in physical restraint, abduction, or any
other such practice. 26 What is probably true of most such groups is
that they offer warmth, friendship, authority, and a prescribed course
of conduct laced with plenty of dogma. 27 No doubt there are serious
efforts to influence the thinking of the new adherent, but these are
clearly not "brainwashing," 28 since the adherent is free to depart if he
chooses.29
B. Deprogrammers and Deprogramming
The new, and I believe dangerous, element in this conflict between
parents and children is "deprogramming." Deprogrammers are people
who, at the request of a parent or other close relative, will have a
member of a religious sect seized, then hold him against his will and
subject him to mental, emotional, and even physical pressures until he
renounces his religious beliefs. 30 Deprogrammers usually work for a
fee, which may easily run as high as $25,000.31
The deprogramming process begins with abduction. Often strong
men muscle the subject into a car and take him to a place where he is
cut off from everyone but his captors. 32 He may be held against his
will for upwards of three weeks.33 Frequently, however, the initial
26. See Editorial: Deprogramming and Religious Liberty, 29 Church & State 212, 230 (1976).
27. See, e.g., Flaste, ParentslChildren: Dealing with Appeal of Religious Sects, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 22, 1977, at B4, col. 1; Gordon,The Kids andthe Cults, Children Today, July/Aug. 1977, at 24,
26.
28. In Helander v. Salonen, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia dismissed a habeas
corpus petition by the parents of a member of the Reverend Moon's Unification Church. Helander v.
Salonen, No. HC 7-75, slip op. at 15 (D.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 23, 1975). After hearing conflicting
testimony by psychiatrists on the question of whether Wendy Helander was "committed, detained,
confined, or restrained from [her] lawful liberty" (D.C. Code Encycl. § 16-1901 (West 1973)) by
means of mind control exercised over her by leaders of the Unification Church, the court found that
there was insufficient evidence to warrant issuance of a writ. Id. at 13-14. The psychiatrist called by
respondents testified that Miss Helander was "healthy," "normal," "extremely confident with
people," and "able to resist the suggestions of others."Id. at 11. For a discussion of brainwashing, see
notes 60-67 infra and accompanying text.
29. See Editorial: Deprogramming and Religious Liberty, 29 Church & State 212, 230 (1976);
notes 123-26 infra and accompanying text.
30. Kelley, Deprogramming and Religious Liberty, Civil Liberties Review 23, 23-26 (July/Aug.
1977).
31. Chandler, TucsonCenter:Bringingthe CultistsBack, Los AngelesTimes, Jan. 3,1977, at 1,
col. 1, 3, col. 3; see Religion: Prison for Patrick?, Time, June 16, 1975, at 70. The average cost of a
deprogramming by those connected with the "Freedom of Thought Foundation" in Tucson, Arizona,
is $9,700. Deprogrammer Defends Method, Nat'l Courier, Apr. 1, 1977, at 17, col. 2.
32. For a description by deprogrammer Ted Patrick of his abductions of certain members of
religious sects, see T. Patrick with T. Dulack, Let Our Children Go! 73-74, 95-102 (1976).
33. One twenty-six-year-old woman targeted by deprogramimers said she was held captive for
1978]
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deprogramming only lasts a few days. 34 The subject's sleep is lim-
ited,35 and he is told that he will not be released until his beliefs meet
his captors' approval. 36 Members of the deprogramming group, as well
as members of the family, come into the room where the victim is
being held and barrage him with questions and denunciations until he
has recanted his newly found religious beliefs. 37
Such deprogramming is described by deprogrammer Ted Patrick in
his book, Let Our Children Go! 38 He told one victim, "I can stay here
three, four months. Even longer. Nobody's going anywhere. '39 He
admits using "Mace" on people who try to interfere with an abduc-
tion, 40 limiting the sleep of the victim, 41 hiring thugs to help him with
his kidnapings, 42 and using real violence on a member of the Hare
Krishna sect. 43
seventy-five days before she succeeded in escaping. Sage, The War on the Culls, Human Behavior,
Oct. 1976, at 40, 40.
34. See Religion: Defreaking Jesus Freaks, Newsweek, Mar. 12, 1973, at 44.
35. E.g., T. Patrick with T. Dulack, Let Our Children Go! 76 (1976).
36. E.g., Roberts, Cult "Deprogrammers" May Face OCJury, Anaheim Bull. (California), Dec.
9, 1974, at A3, col. 3.
37. See, e.g., Kaufman, Saving Your Childrenfrom Salvation, N.Y. Magazine, Apr. 16, 1973,
at 55, 56.
38. T. Patrick with T. Dulack, Let Our Children Go! (1976).
39. Id. at 24.
40. Id. at 70, 223.
41. Id. at 76.
42. Id. at 181.
43. Id. at 188-89:
" 'Get me a pair of scissors,' I (Patrick] said.
" 'Scissors? What for?'
" 'First thing we're going to do is cut that knot of hair off his head.'
"Ed came to attention. 'What? Who are you? What right do you have to go cutting my hair? I have
a right to wear this. It's part of my religion. I'm a legal adult. I'm twenty years old.'
" 'Shut up and sit down,' I told him. 'Just shut your mouth and listen.'
" 'I won't listen. I don't have to listen. I want to leave!'
" 'Well, you're not going to leave. Where's those scissor,?'
"Four of his relatives held him down and I cut off the tuft of hair they all wear on the back of their
heads and I removed the beads from around his neck. As soon as we let him up, he started chanting
again at the top of his voice, 'Hare Krishna, Hare Krishna, Hare Hare, Hare... 'Then he saw my
tape recorder on a table, seized it, and smashed it to bits on the floor. Then he made a dash for the
door, but was intercepted by the others in the adjoining game room.
"In the game room Dr. Shapiro had a lot of lovely and expensive art objects and souvenirs he'd
collected over the years and Ed began smashing them, one by one, just ripping the place apart,
chanting all the while. I hadn't seen such violent energy since Wes Lockwood. I figured the treatment
ought to be the same as it was for Wes, so I took him by the arms and flung him into a corner up
against the wall, and I said, 'All right, you hatchet-head [. .], you move out of there and
I'll knock your [._ head off.'
"But he wriggled out of my grasp and ran across the room, screaming, 'Get the [-_] out of this
house! Don't touch me!'
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One would ask where deprogrammers get the authority to make
these cosmic judgments about religious sects. What qualifications do
they have to adjudge persons "brainwashed" or to apply dangerous
methods of enforced behavior modification? Is this a group of psychia-
trists, theologians, and social scientists? No. Ted Patrick, for example,
says he is a high school dropout.44 His only training appears to be a
working knowledge of the Christian Bible.45 There is no evidence that
he knows anything about eastern religions. 46 Nor are there indications
that other deprogrammers are qualified to make judgments about the
mind, the soul, God, or the Unborn, Unoriginated, Unformed One.
47
Since Ted Patrick began deprogramming people in San Diego in
1971,48 the deprogramming movement has grown tremendously.
49
Patrick claims that he does not deprogram for a profit, but has his
expenses paid by the parents who enlist his aid.50 Deprogramming has,
however, become a somewhat costly proposition.51 People around the
country have organized "underground deprogramming networks"
52
with pro-deprogramming chapters in various cities.5 3 One lawyer in
"At this, Ed Painter got furious and cocked his arm as if to lay Ed out cold. I managed to push him
out of the way just in time. 'Easy, Ed. Never mind. Just cool it.'
"Then I picked Ed up by the front of his robes and marched him backwards across the room,
slamming him bodily against the wall. 'You listen to me! You so much as wiggle your toes again, I'm
gonna put my fist down your throat!' His eyes got bigger and bigger with fear. He sat down abruptly. I
had a picture of Prabhupada and I tore it up in front of him and said, 'There's the no good [ ...
_] you worship. And you call him God.' The usual line of approach.
"Inside of an hour, he was out of it. The Krishnas are easy."
In a suit for false imprisonment and other torts on account of attempts to deprogram Wendy
Helander (see note 28supra), she was awarded ajudgment of $5,000 against Ted Patrick. The Court
commented: "The modus operandi adopted by the defendant and his associates-luring the plaintiff
away from the Unification Church premises by deception, attempting to 'deprogram' her by crude,
callous, and brow-beating tactics, shifting her from place to place and confining her against her
will,-smacks more of a fictional television melodrama, rather than a real-life incident." Helander v.
Patrick, No. 15 90 62, slip op. at 2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 1976).
44. T. Patrick with T. Dulack, Let Our Children Go! 231 (1976).
45. Id. at 226-35.
46. See id.
47. See Sage, The War on the Cults, Human Behavior, Oct. 1976, at 40, 44, 46.
48. T. Patrick with T. Dulack, Let Our Children Go! 64-68 (1976).
49. See Sage, The War on the Cults, Human Behavior, Oct. 1976, at 40, 40.
50. T. Patrick with T. Dulack, Let Our Children Go! 77 (1976).
51. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Religion: Kidnaping for Christ, Time, Mar. 12, 1973, at 83, 83; International
Foundation for Individual Freedom, Memorandum (Apr. 22, 1977), on file with Fordham Law
Review. This organization planned a conference "to bring together representatives of all of the
regional and local groups of parents of present and former cult-members, ex-members of cults, and
citizens informed about the mind controlling techniques of destructive cults." Id.
53. Deprogramming- Documenting the Issue 12-13 (prepared for the American Civil Liberties
Union Conference on Religious Deprogramming, in New York City, Feb. 5, 1977).
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Tucson, Arizona, has formed a tax-exempt foundation with the pur-
pose of making Tucson the "deprogramming center of the country. '5 4
All too often, deprogrammers are able to kidnap members of religious
organizations without interference by police and local officials-or
even with their cooperation 55-and smoothly transport them to places
where they can be confined for rapid brainwashing.5 6 Free-lance
deprogrammers are operating around the country and cashing in on
the profit making potential of deprogramming.5 7
Deprogrammers are able to produce many young people who have
been deprogrammed and who will testify to the benefits of depro-
gramming. They will claim that their minds were enslaved and that
they have been brought back to reason.58 I think that this phenomenon
is explained by two factors. First, the deprogramming usually reunites
the young people with their parents and brings about the kind of
reconciliation and attention that many of these young people have been
seeking all of their lives. Suddenly, they find out that their parents are
concerned about them. The prodigal's return to the family fold is
usually more than enough to compensate for the loss of a new-found
religious belief which may have been, in part, a rebellion against the
parents in the first place.5 9
Second, the method of deprogramming is really a form of counter-
conversion, a system of behavior modification intended to change the
victim's beliefs and make him conform to religious beliefs and practices
acceptable to his parents. 60 It is far more like "brainwashing" than the
conversion process by which members join various sects. The re-
straint, deprivation of sleep, constant talk, denunciation, alternation of
tough and easy talk, emotional appeals, and incessant questioning
finally cause a break in the will, giving the deprogrammer a certain
54. Sage, The War on the Cults, Human Behavior, Oct. 1976, at 40, 48. Those in charge of the
foundation assert that it is not used for actual deprogramming, but merely as a "rehabilitation center"
for those who have already been deprogrammed. Often persons at the foundation are still under a
court's conservatorship order, however, and are not free to leave. See generally Deprogramming
Update, 31 Church & State 35, 35, 38 (1978).
55. See, e.g., Patrick Trial Involves N. Y. Official, Wash. Post, Aug. 3, 1973, at A3, col. 1; note
69 infra and accompanying text.
56. E.g., Affidavit of Pam Fanshier, in Deprogramming: Documenting the Issue 108 (prepared
for the American Civil Liberties Union Conference on Religious Deprogramming, in New York City,
Feb. 5, 1977).
57. See Robbins, Even a Moonie Has CivilRights, The Nation, Feb. 26, 1977, at 238, 238-40.
58. See, e.g., T. Patrick with T. Dulack, Let Our Children Gol 281 (1976).
59. See Dulack, Foreword to T. Patrick with T. Dulack, Let Our Children Go] 5-6 (1976);
Editorial: Fraternity, Liberty, Equality, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1977, at 28, col. 1.
60. Compare T. Patrick with T. Dulack, Let Our Children Go! 16, 67, 76-79, 97,149 (1976), with
J. Meerloo, The Rape of the Mind 30, 74, 84-86, 91-92 (Universal Library ed. 1961).
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power over the victim. 61 The "break" described in Patrick's book 62 is
not unlike the break described by Dr. Joost A. M. Meerloo, in his book
on brainwashing, 63 as having been suffered by victims of Nazi interro-
gation. 64 The result of deprogramming may well be the kind of
"[s]ubmission to and [p]ositive [i]dentification with the [e]nemy '6S
described by Dr. Meerloo of POW subjects of brainwashing: 66
As has already been mentioned, the moment of surrender may often arrive suddenly.
It is as if the stubborn negative suggestibility changed critically into a surrender and
affirmation. What the inquisitor calls the sudden inner illumination and conversion is a
total reversal of inner strategy in the victim. From this time on, in psychoanalytic
terms, a parasitic superego lives in man's conscience, and he wvill speak his new
master's voice. In my experience such sudden surrender often occurred together with
61. See T. Patrick with T. Dulack, Let Our Children Go! 16, 67, 76-79, 97, 149 (1976).
62. See id. at 35, 79, 106.
63. J. Meerloo, The Rape of the Mind (Universal Library ed. 1961).
64. "Several victims of the Nazi inquisition have told me that the moment of surrender occurred
suddenly and against their will. For days they had faced the fury of their interrogators, and then
suddenly they fell apart. 'All right, all right, you can have anything you want.'
"And then came hours of remorse, of resolution, of a desperate wish to return to their previous
position of firm resistance. They wanted to cry out: 'Don't ask me anything else. I won't answer.' And
yet something in them, that conforming, complying being hidden in all of us, was on the move.
"This sudden surrender often happened after an unexpected accusation, a shock, a humiliation
that particularly hurt, a punishment that burned, a surprising logic in the inquisitor's question that
could not be counterargued." Id. at 75. Compare id. with the following description of a successful
deprogramming, given by the subject more than a year later. "[Elventually you get taunted into
discussions and I got taunted into them and into reasoning with them.
"What caused me to break was such a stupid thing... I can't even remember what it was, just
some silly point. Somebody sent them a newspaper clipping about the group, and I said 'no, it's not
true, prove it to me!' I was beginning to doubt-they had put so many doubts in my head .... And
Ted [Patrick] said, 'Well, I can't prove it to you, rve got the proof out in the car.... .' It %%-as the
frustration of not knowing and finally for some reason, I started breaking down, crying, for no reason
at all, I just began to break down and hugged me [sic], and my father thought that I iwas totally free
... [.] I decided what I would do was just pretend at that point that I was free of the whole thing.
Then I would pretend I was going through with the whole thing, and when they got to a point where
they could trust me, I would try to escape[.]
"A lot of kids try and do that.... what happens is that once you've already begun that emotional
breakdown, it all unravels itself and eventually you've all unraveled to the same old person you were
before you ever [joined the religious sect].
"Next morning [my father wanted me to give him some information about another member of my
church]. I wouldn't tell him. I got really upset because I was afraid they were going to go and kidnap
him .... I got upset and almost wanted to kill myself. [I poked my arms through the plate glass
window, which] sliced my right arm just about in half ...." Hall, The Trie I'ision of Wies
Lockwood, Yale Daily News Magazine, May 1, 1975, at 12, 27-28. The reconciliation with the
young man's captors was subsequently completed, and he later testified against his former
religious associates. Id. at 28.
65. J. Meerloo, The Rape of the Mind 91 (Universal Library ed. 1961).
66. Id. at 84-85.
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hysterical outbursts into crying and laughing, like a baby surrendering after obstinate
temper tantrums. The inquisitor can attain this phase more easily by assuming a
paternal attitude. As a matter of fact, many a P.O.W. was courted by a form of
paternal kindness-gifts, sweets at birthdays, and the promise of more cheerful things
to come.
67
III. THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF DEPROGRAMMERS' TARGETS
A. The Rights of Sects and Their Members
The constitutional right of people to practice their own religion, no
matter how unorthodox, or how unacceptable to parents, relatives,
and friends, has recently been the subject of several cases involving
conflict between deprogrammers and religious groups.
The constitutional issue arises because deprogramming does not take
place in a vacuum outside the realm of legal encounter. Abduction,
unlawful restraint, physical assault, deprivation of sleep, and enforced
behavior modification do.not in themselves involve state action when
carried out by private individuals. But when the state condones or
assists such action, constitutional rights are being violated. 68
Deprogrammers have often received the tacit, if not open, support of
local police, the FBI, and the courts. 69 In his book, Ted Patrick calls
for legal action to stop "the cults. ' '70 Such action has been considered
in at least six state legislatures. 7' There have also been McCarthy-like
67. Id. at 91. The counter-conversion process carried out by deprogrammers may very well
impose upon the victim a new identity, one acceptable to the parents, and hostile to the religious
group. Long after the deprogramming trauma has worn off, the identity remains. It is necessary for
integration of the personality. Identity is vital to the sense of self that each person must have, and it
must be supported by overt action. The deprogrammed youth may feel a powerful need to attack his
former religion, not because it is evil, but because he cannot live with his new identity unless he does.
68. In Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of "Political" and "Economic" Compulsion, 35
Colum. L. Rev. 149 (1935), the author observes that constitutional proscriptions apply not only to
actions taken by a state, but also to actions which it compels or condones. Id. at 149, It might be
unconstitutional, for instance, if a state withdrew a remedy from private individuals, such as a right
to recover damages for trespass to property, even though the state's only role was inaction, and the
injurious acts were committed by private parties. Id. at 179
69. E.g., T. Patrick with T. Dulack, Let Our Children Go! 144 (1976); Address by Michael
Trauscht, Int'l Ass'n of Chiefs of Police Conference, in Miami Beach, Fla. (Sept. 27, 1976); see note
55 supra and accompanying text.
70. T. Patrick with T. Dulack, Let Our Children Go! 259-64 (1976).
71. Parent-Child Conflict on Religion Now Touches Variety of Groups, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1,
1978, at 24, col. 1. A resolution was introduced into the Pennsylvania General Assembly to establish a
committee to "study, investigate, and report to the House, on the activities of the pseudo-religious
cults in Pennsylvania and their effect on the Commonwealth's citizens," and on their fund-raising
activities. Pa. H. Res. No. 37, 1977 Sess. 2 (Mar. 2). This committee was to be given full subpoena
power and authorized to administer oaths and affirmations. Id. The preamble to this resolution
stated that the organizations "allegedly lure young people into their movements by using mind control
or mental manipulation and coercion." Id. at 1. The Pennsylvania Catholic Conference opposed the
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"investigations" of religious "cults" which have resulted in no prosecu-
tions, but involved plenty of character assassination. 72
Recently, in New York City, a Queens County grand jury handed
down an indictment against Hare Krishna leaders on the theory that
they had unlawfully imprisoned their members through "mind con-
trol. '73 In California, a judge granted conservatorships 74 over adult
members of a religious sect, allowing deprogrammers to do their
resolution, and called such efforts "hazardous to religious liberty in general." Pennsylvania Catholic
Conference, Legislation Aimed at Religious Cults Poses Serious Threat (Oct. 1977), on file with
Fordham Law Review. The Conference asked, "If the legislators may use their subpoena and other
investigative powers against one group which it says is 'pseudo' religious, what is to prevent their
proceeding against any other religious group?" Id. It added, "We are sympathetic to attempts by the
Legislature to deal with the very perplexing problem that certain groups are causing young people
and their families. But the Conference believes that it is not possible to deal with such matters
legislatively." Id.
A Vermont Senate committee issued a report recommending the adoption of a bill which would
permit the ex parte appointment of a temporary guardian for a person "unable to properly care for
himself or his property." Vt. Sen. Comm. for the Investigation of Alleged Deceptive, Fraudulent and
Criminal Practices of Various Organizations in the State, Report, 54th Biennial Sess. S (Jan. 1977);
see note 146 infra and accompanying text. The report stated that during the five days the committee
held hearings, charges were made primarily against the Unification Church, and also against the
Children of God and Hare Krishna. Id. at 2. A second bill recommended by the committee as a result
of the hearings would have regulated charitable fundraising. Id. at 3.
There has also been discussion in Congress on this subject. On August 4, 1977, Representative
Giaimo indicated that he had been been studying how to apply federal criminal laws to alleged
brainwashing by religious groups. He noted that the matter is very perplexing, but concluded that
"because of the constitutional issues involved, any attempt to draft legislation to encompass within
the criminal statutes 'brainwashing' or 'mind control' will be considered unfavorably by the very
department which would have to enforce the law." 123 Cong. Rec. H8683 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977).
See also Letter from Benjamin R. Civiletti, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division of the
Justice Department, to Congressman Robert N. Giaimo, reprinted in 123 Cong. Rec. H8683-84
(daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977).
In a letter from Richard Thornburgh of the Justice Department to Congressman Giaimo, the
Justice Department noted that it "cannot conduct a general inquiry into the activities of a religious
organization. There first must be an allegation of a violation of Federal law." Letter from Richard L.
Thornburgh, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division of the Justice Department, to Con-
gressman Robert N. Giaimo (Sept. 7, 1976), reprinted in 123 Cong. Rec. H 100S1-52 (daily ed. Sept.
14, 1976). The letter discussed possible violations of federal law resulting from the activities of the
churches, such as violations of the antislavery and forced labor statutes, but observed that these
statutes are generally inapplicable to services performed for a religious group. Id. at HI0051-52. The
letter concluded, "In view of the more stringent burden of proof required in criminal prosecutions, it
seems clear that aggrieved parents would have a greater likelihood of success in pursuing civil
remedies rather than requesting criminal prosecutions." d. at H10052.
72. See, e.g., Religion: Children of"Moses," Newsweek, Oct. 28, 1974, at 70; Lefkowit: Lists
Charges on Sect, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1974, at 37, col. 1.
73. People v. Murphy, No. 2012/76, slip op. at 8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mdar. 16, 1977). The indictment
was dismissed. Id. at 14.
74. Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 956 & n. 1, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234, 235 & n. 1(1st
Dist. 1977).
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work.75 In a New York prosecution of Ted Patrick for unlawful
imprisonment several years ago, 76 the trial judge allowed the defen-
dant, as part of an effort to prove the defense of justification, to probe
and ridicule the most deeply held beliefs of a religious group. 77
At issue is the question of whether the courts are ever allowed to
consider the truth or falsity of any religious belief. Furthermore, there
is the question of whether the courts are allowed to determine that an
individual's religious conversion was not voluntary, but resulted from
an alleged exercise of mind control. At the heart of the constitutional
issue is the nexus between the free exercise clause of the first amend-
ment and several other basic constitutional rights, particularly that of
free speech.
Deprogramming, as a type of outlaw vigilante action, arose because
of parents' inability to charge religious sects with violation of any
known laws. Though deprogrammers charge new religious groups
with fraud,78 they have not legally proved this.79 A church or religious
group's practice of accepting voluntary contributions from adult mem-
bers can hardly be defined as fraud. Among the thousands of sects
condemned by deprogrammers, there may be some which are in it only
for the money, but generally these groups are dedicated and
sincere-whether or not one accepts their creeds.80
Parents' real concern is not with any allegedly illegal action on the
part of various sects, but with the process by which new members are
proselytized and then confirmed in their beliefs by leaders of the
groups. That process is speech. Preaching, praying, chanting, teach-
75. Parents Win Custody of5 Members of Moon's Church, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1977, at Al,
col. 1. For a discussion of the issuance of these conservatorship orders, held by the appellate court to
be unconstitutional, see notes 263-88 infra and accompanying text.
76. People v. Patrick, No. N-320779 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Aug. 6, 1973); see notes 206-24 iitra and
accompanying text.
77. See Patrick Acquitted in Seizure of Youth, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1973, at 24, col. 5.
78. T. Patrick with T. Dulack, Let Our Children Go! 20 (1976).
79. The primary specific act portrayed as fraudulent towards the plaintiff in the complaint In
Turner v. Unification Church was that plaintiff "was promised that she would be helping to create a
better world." Complaint at 4, Turner v. Unification Church, No. 75-0424 (D.R.I., filed Dec. 19,
1975). Plaintiff alleged that as a result of being induced to join the Unification Church she was "held
in peonage and involuntary servitude." Id. at 1. She sought the value of her services, id. at 4, on the
theory that the Unification Church is a commercial enterprise, "not an establishment of religion
within the meaning of the First and Fourteenth Amendments," id. at 1-2. Religious organizations
may, of course, be liable for traditional common law torts, including false imprisonment. See
Whittaker v. Sandford, 110 Me. 77, 85 A. 399 (1912); Gallon v. House of Good Shepherd, 158 Mich.
361, 122 N.W. 631 (1909); Note,People v. Religious Cults:Legal Guidelinesfar Criminal Activities,
Tort Liability, and Parental Remedies, 11 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 1025, 1037-46 (1977).
80. See Cox, PlayingtheDevil'sAdvocate, AsIt Were, NY. Times, Feb. 16, 1977, at A2S, col.
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ing, and meditating all constitute practices heavily protected by the
Constitution.
The first amendment "embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe
and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the
second cannot be." 8 1 The freedom to act may be restricted, but we
must distinguish between those acts which constitute "speech," those
acts protected by other sections of the Constitution, and those acts
falling outside of constitutional protection. Any state invasion of a
member of a disfavored sect's right to believe not only interferes with
his free exercise of religion as guaranteed by the first amendment, but
also is an unconstitutional establishment of religion. When the state
applies differential treatment to various religious beliefs, there is an
establishment of religion.8 2 Interference with disfavored religious be-
liefs by judicial inquiry as to the truth or falsity of those beliefs or by
suppression of members' religious speech is, therefore, a violation of
both aspects of the first amendment.
The Supreme Court has on several occasions indicated that the first
amendment forbids the courts to consider the truth or falsity of a
religion. Former Justice Douglas has written:
"The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the
establishment of no sect.". . . Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may
not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences
which are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact that
they may be beyond the ken of mortals does not mean that they can be made suspect
before the law.83
In United States v. Seeger 84 the Supreme Court recognized that
when Congress required belief in a "Supreme Being" to qualify a
person for conscientious objector status, it did not allow local draft
boards to inquire into the truth of anyone's belief. 85 "The validity of
what he believes cannot be questioned," 86 said former Justice Clark.
The Court asked only whether "the claimed belief occup[ies] the same
place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in God holds in
the life of one clearly qualified for exemption." 8 7 This could include
"deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs." 88
81. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
82. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963).
83. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13
WaIl.) 679, 728 (1871)).
84. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
85. Id. at 184-85.
86. Id. at 184.
87. Id.
88. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970).
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Courts may in certain situations consider the sincerity with which
religious precepts are held,8 9 but such an inquiry must be cautious so
as not to encroach on the protected area of truth or falsity. 90
In the realm of action, the state may interfere with those practices of
religious groups which pose a threat to the rights of others or the good
order of society. 9 1 While one may question the value judgments by
which the courts have arrived at their sometimes conflicting rulings,
one recognizes the validity of the underlying judicial premise by which
the courts have upheld various kinds of legislative restrictions on
religious groups. Thus, the Supreme Court has upheld the application
of laws against polygamy, 9 2 Sunday closing laws, 93 compulsory vacci-
nation laws, 94 and child labor laws, 95 despite a claim that the free
exercise of religion was thereby violated. Other courts have allowed
criminal prosecution for drug-related offenses, despite a claim that the
drugs were part of a religion. 96 A free exercise of religion argument
was rejected in cases involving fraudulent securities activities 97 and
the handling of poisonous snakes98 in violation of statutory prohi-
bitions. Courts have split on requiring submission to blood transfu-
sions. 99
In the cases where courts have interfered with the activities of
religious groups, the interference has usually involved traditional
standards for public health, safety, and education. 100 Even in these
89. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185-87 (1965); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78,
81-84 (1944).
90. United States v. Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687, 698 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
91. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879).
92. Id.
93. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
94. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
95. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
96. United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968); People v. Mullins, 50 Cal, App. 3d
61, 123 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1st Dist. 1975); State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 917 (1967). Contra, People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813,40 Cal. Rptr. 69
(1964).
97. SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976).
98. Hill v. State, 38 Ala. App. 404, 88 So. 2d 880 (1956); Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky.
437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942); Harden v. State, 188 Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948).
99. Compare In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1007- 10
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964),with In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 372-73, 205
N.E.2d 435, 441-42 (1965). See Byrn, Compulsory Lifesaving Treatmentfor the Competent Adult, 44
Fordham L. Rev. 1, 10-13, 17-19 (1976).
100. See, e.g., Muhammad Temple of Islam-Shreveport v. City of Shreveport, 387 F. Supp.
1129, 1134 (W.D. La. 1974), aff'd, 517 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 197.5); Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky.
437, 441-42, 164 S.W.2d 972, 973-74 (1942); State v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 735, 51 S.E.2d 179,
179-80, appeal dismissed sub nom. Bunn v. North Carolina, 336 U.S. 942 (1949).
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areas, however, the courts have leaned towards tolerance where it
could not be shown that the act or omission caused real injury. 10,
"[O]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give
occasion for permissible limitation .102
The area in which courts, particularly the Supreme Court, have
granted the widest latitude to religious sects is that of expression.
Indeed, early Supreme Court decisions upholding the rights of religious
groups rested on the free speech guarantees of the first amendment
rather than on the free exercise clause. In Lovell v. City of Griffin'0 3
and Schneider v. New Jersey,'0 4 the Court allowed Jehovah's Wit-
nesses to distribute religious tracts on the basis of the free speech
clause.105 In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 0 6
the Court upheld the right of a child to refuse, on religious grounds, to
salute the flag, but again based its decision on free speech grounds. '0 7
Finally, in Cantwell v. Connecticut,'°8 the Court brought the free
speech and free exercise clauses together to protect the right of
Jehovah's Witnesses to go door-to-door proselytizing, playing records,
distributing literature, 0 9 and performing those very types of actions
that today's deprogrammers condemn. Like the so-called "cults" which
are attacked by deprogrammers, the Jehovah's Witnesses were not
engaged in any action violating traditional standards of health, safety,
or education.110 The Court noted:
We find in the instant case no assault or threatening of bodily harm, no truculent
bearing, no intentional discourtesy, no personal abuse. On the contrary, we find only
an effort to persuade a willing listener to buy a book or to contribute money in the
interest of what Cantwell, however misguided others may think him, conceived to be
true religion."'
The complaint against Cantwell was essentially no different from
the deprogrammers' complaint against the "cults," i.e., that he used
speech to indoctrinate others into a false religion, and to wean them
101. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67
(1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
102. Sherbertv. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,406 (1963) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.s. 516, 530
(1945)).
103. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
104. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
105. Id. at 164-65; 303 U.S. at 451-53.
106. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
107. Id. at 632-42.
108. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
109. Id. at 301.
110. Id. at 310.
111. Id.
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away from the established, respectable religions of the day. The Court
answered:
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise. In
both fields the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To
persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to
exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in church or
state, and even to false statement. But the people of this nation have ordained in the
light of history, that in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties
are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of
the citizens of a democracy. 112
The act of speech by which religious groups attract, induct, and
indoctrinate members must, of necessity, be protected under the
Cantwell doctrine.' 1 3 If any such groups teach their adherents to
separate from family, abandon wordly goods, forfeit a college educa-
tion, despise political and social' institutions, or denounce other reli-
gions, that teaching is protected free expression. The teachers may not
be prosecuted for teaching; legal sanctions which would ordinarily
protect their followers from deprogramming cannot be lifted because
the adherents listen; and the state may not condone or assist depro-
grammers of those who choose to accept the teaching.
If the state were allowed to determine that proselytizing resulting in
conversion were really "brainwashing," it would be questioning the
validity of a religious experience and thus, as a result, the underlying
validity of the religion.' 1 4 It would also be invading the highly
protected area of free speech. Such a determination would violate the
free exercise, establishment, and free speech clauses of the first
amendment.
This matter is squarely presented in the novel New York case of
People v. Murphy. 11s The Murphy case grew out of an effort by a
Hare Krishna woman to bring charges against her mother and a
private detective who had aided in seizing her." t6 She was held for
four days of deprogramming.117 In her testimony before the grand
112. Id.
113. See International Soc'yfor Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Conlisk, 374 F. Supp. 1010, 1012,
1018 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (city enjoined from preventing Hare Krishna member from public proselytiz-
ing); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 347 F. Supp. 945,
946-48 (E.D. La. 1972) (city ordinance prohibiting religious solicitation of donations unconstitu-
tional as applied); In re Conversion Center, Inc., 388 Pa. 239, 245, 130 A.2d 107, 110 (1957)
(peaceful efforts at conversion of one faith's members to another faith protected).
114. Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 987-88, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234, 255-56 (1st Dist.
1977).
115. No. 2012/76 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 16, 1977).
116. Id., slip op. at 3.
117. Id.
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jury, the woman's mother said her daughter was a victim of "mental
kidnapping" by the International Society for Krishna Consciousness
(Iskcon Inc.), and that she was only "rescuing her."' 118 The grand jury
declined to indict the private detective or the parent, then heard
testimony on Iskcon, Inc. 119 Subsequently, the grand jury handed
down an indictment charging two Krishna leaders and Iskcon, Inc.,
with restraining the Krishna woman and another member who was
unsuccessfully deprogrammed 120 "under circumstances that exposed
them to a risk of serious physical injury."1 21 The language was based
upon the wording of section 135.10 of the New York Penal Law which
deals with first degree unlawful imprisonment. 122 Justice John J.
Leahy identified the issue as follows:
The entire crux of the argument propounded by the People is that through "mind
control", "brainwashing", and/or "manipulation of mental processes" the defendants
destroyed the free will of the alleged victims, obtaining over them mind control to the
point of absolute domination and thereby coming within the purview of the issue of
unlawful imprisonment. 123
Justice Leahy then analyzed the law of unlawful imprisonment and
pointed out that there was no evidence that the Hare Krishna members
had been subject to either physical restraint or deception. 124 Like other
converts to the new religious sects, they had freely and voluntarily
chosen- this radically different way of life. 125
The court rejected the prosecution's argument that the daily ritual
chanting and other activities of the Krishna movement constituted a
form of intimidation and restraint over the members. 126 Justice Leahy
noted that cases allowing prosecution for unlawful imprisonment in-
volving "psychologically induced confessions, mental disease or defect,
hypnosis to destroy a free will, intoxication, and coverture"'127 were
118. Id.
119. Id. at 3-4.
120. The attempted deprogramming of this member, Ed Shapiro, is described in T. Patrick with
T. Dulack, Let Our Children Go! 186-97 (1976).
121. People v. Murphy, No. 2012/76, slip op. at 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 16, 1977). Iskcon, Inc.,
and one of its leaders were also indicted for attempted grand larceny in the first degree. Id.
122. N.Y. Penal Law § 135.10 (McKinney 1975).
123. People v. Murphy, No. 2012/76, slip op. at 8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 16, 1977).
124. Id. at 8-9, 12-13.
125. Id. at 8-9; cf. Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455 (1946) (reversing the kidnaping
conviction of a sixty-eight-year-old Mormon). In the latter case, Chatwin was accused of luring a
fifteen-year-old girl from her home state for the purpose of "celestial marriage" according to the
Mormon creed. Id. at 457. The Court found that the evidence showed a voluntary act by the girl,
rather than abduction by Chatwin, andthat the federal kidnaping statute required abduction against
the will of the victim. Id. at 464.
126. People v. Murphy, No. 2012/76, slip op. at 8-9 (N.Y. Sup. C. Mar. 16, 1977).
127. Id. at 12-13.
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not applicable to the charges brought against the Hare Krishnas. He
found that in every case, the defendants were seeking to compel their
victims to perform an illegal act by illegal means, such as false
representation. 128
Justice Leahy indicated that he understood the hurt felt by loved
ones whose children had given up their worldly possessions, social
contacts, and former way of life for a new religion, 129 but came down
on the side of allowing individuals to choose their own path to
salvation. "Religious proselytizing and the recruitment of and mainte-
nance of belief through a strict regimen, meditation, chanting, self-
denial and the communication of other religious teachings cannot
under our laws-as presently enacted-be construed as criminal in
nature and serve as a basis for a criminal indictment." 30
Finally, the court, recognizing the seriousness and novelty of the
issues before it, made this declaration:
It is at this juncture the court sounds the dire caveat to prosecutional agencies throught-
out [sic] the length and breadth of our great nation that all of the rights of all our
people so dearly gained and provided for, under the Constitution of the United States
and the Constitutions of all States of our Nation shall be zealously protected to the full
extent of the law. The entire and basic issue before this court is whether or not the two
alleged victims in this case, and the defendants, will be allowed to practice the religion
of their choice-and this must be answered with a resounding affirmation."'1
The same issue, i.e., whether religious sects use "mind control" to
restrain their members, was later presented in the California case of
Katz v. Superior Court.' 32 That case involved the use of temporary
conservatorship proceedings to gain custody of adult members of the
Unification Church of the Reverend Sun Myung Moon. They were then
to be deprogrammed.1 33 One of the issues that aroge in the case was
whether the orders granted by the lower court, which initially allowed
the members of the Moon Church to be turned over to deprogram-
mers, 13 4 constituted a violation of their first amendment right to
religious freedom.135 The parents contended that religious freedom
was not involved, but that "the sole issue [was] whether or not the
128. Id. at 13.
129. Id. at i1.
130. Id. at 11-12. The indictment for attempted grand larceny in the first degree was also
dismissed. See id. at 2, 14.
131. Id. at 9.
132. 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1st Dist. 1977).
133. See Parents Win Custody of5 Members of Moon's Church, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1977, at
Al, col. 1.
134. Id.;see Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952. 956 & n.1, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234, 235 &
n.1 (1st Dist. 1977).
135. Id. at 983, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
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conservatees [had] been deprived of their reasoning powers by artful
and designing persons.' 36 The court indicated that an inquiry into
such a matter could in itself constitute a violation of first amendment
freedoms:
Evidence was introduced of the actions of the proposed conservatees in changing their
life style. When the court is asked to determine whether that change was induced by
faith or by coercive persuasion is it not in turn investigating and questioning the
validity of that faith? At the same time the trier of fact is asked to adjudge the good
faith and bona fideness of the beliefs of the conservatees preceptors. If it be assumed
that certain leaders were using psychological methods to proselytize and hold the
allegiance of recruits to the church or cult, call it what we will, can it be said their
actions were not dictated by faith merely because others who engaged in such practices
have recanted? The total picture disclosed must be tested by principles applicable to
the regulation of acts of religious organizations and their members. t37
The court noted that there may be "a compelling state interest in
preventing fraud under the guise of religious belief,"' 38 but said that
the first amendment applied to the religious acts as well as beliefs of
unorthodox sects. 139 For the practices of a religious group to be
regulated, they must pose "some substantial threat to public safety,
peace or order. ' 140 The court found no such grounds for governmental
regulation in the case of the voluntary religious conversion of the
followers of the Reverend Moon. The court said: "We conclude that in
the absence of such actions as render the adult believer himself gravely
disabled as defined in the law of this state, the processes of this state
cannot be used to deprive the believer of his freedom of action and to
subject him to involuntary treatment."' 4 1
The American Civil Liberties Union has condemned deprogramming
as a violation of first amendment rights.142 The Annual Convention of
136. Id. at 983-84, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
137. Id. at 987-88, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 255-56 (footnote omitted).
138. Id. at 988, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
139. Id. at 984, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 253 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963)).
140. Id. at 984, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
141. Id. at 988-89, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 256. As broad as this standard might seem, it is within the
scope of first amendment rights as previously defined. Some courts have held that an adult may refuse
life-sustaining medical treatment, on religious grounds, even though death may result. See note 99
supra and accompanying text.
142. "ACLU opposes the use of mental incompetency proceedings, temporary conservator-
ship, or denial of government protection as a method of depriving people of the free exercise of
religion, at least with respect to people who have reached the age of majority.
"Modes of religious proselytizing or persuasion for a continued adherence that do not employ
physical coercion or threat of same are protected by the free exercise of religion clause of the First
Amendment against action of state laws or by state officials. The claim of free exercise may not be
overcome by the contention that 'brainwashing' or 'mind control' has been used, in the absence of
evidence that the above standards have been violated." Prichard, Deprogramming and the Law app.
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the New England Psychological Association, the National Council of
Churches, the World Fellowship of Religions, and professionals in
theology and psychology have also condemned deprogramming for the
same reason. 
14 3
The issue is not likely to die with these cases, the first of their kind.
The deprogrammers still have the sympathy of police, the courts, 144
and, probably, the general populace. 145 There have been serious
efforts to obtain legislation which would make it easy for an individual
to be forcibly removed from a religious group which deprogrammers
consider to practice brainwashing. 146 The next step, of course, would
be to outlaw various practices of the religious groups themselves.
Consider the possibility of a law which would outlaw brainwashing.
How would such a law be applied? Would the court be entitled to
prohibit the Hare Krishna movement from engaging in ritual chant-
ing? Could pentecostal religious sects be prohibited from speaking in
tongues, fundamentalists from memorizing Bible verses? Could prac-
titioners of Transcendental Meditation, or other types of meditation,
be prohibited from reciting mantras, counting their breaths, or practic-
ing yoga?
If there were to be laws against brainwashing, such laws would
have to be particularly and carefully drawn. 147 They would have to
prohibit abduction, physical restraint, involuntary subjugation to in-
doctrination, deprivation of sleep, and lengthy and consistent efforts to
break the will of the subject. 148 It is doubtful that any religious group
A (American Civil Liberties Union Rep. Jan. 1978) (quoting a statement adopted by the ACLU
National Board in March 1977).
143. Deprogramming: Documenting the Issue 183-86, 191-97 (prepared for the American Civil
Liberties Union Conference on Religious Deprogramming, in New York City, Feb. 5, 1977); Cox,
Playing the Devil's Advocate, AsIt Were, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1977, at A25, col. 1. For a discussion
of deprogramming in light of religious principles, see J. Yamamoto, The Puppet Master 99-103
(1977).
144. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Bilgore, Could You Be Brainwashed?, Glamour, Jan. 1977, at 96; Black, The
Secrets of the Innocents: Why Kids Join Cults, Woman's Day, Feb. 1977, at 91; Edwards, Rescue
froma Fanatic Cult, Reader's Digest, Apr. 1977, at 129, condensedfrom Medical Economics, Nov. 1,
1976.
146. See, e.g., Vt. Sen. Comm. for the Investigation of Alleged Deceptive, Fraudulent and
Criminal Practices of Various Organizations in the State, Report, 54th Biennial Sess. 4-6 (Jan. 1977).
This report recommends the adoption of a bill which would allow a temporary guardian to be
appointed for an individual, withotit notice to the individual. The guardian could then "subject the
ward to appropriate psychiatric treatment," i.e., deprogramming. Id. at S. For a discussion of such
use of guardianship or conservatorship proceedings, see notes 263-88 supra and accompanying text.
Other'legislative activity is described in note 71 supra.
147. Such laws could not violate freedom of speech and the right to hear guaranteed by the first
amendment. U.S. Const. amend. I; Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972).
148. For a discussion of brainwashing techniques, see notes 60-67 supra and accompanying text.
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could ever be prosecuted under such a law, 14 9 and the effect of this
law would most likely be to impale the deprogrammers on their own
sword. For it is they, and not the religious groups, who engage in such
practices. 150
B. The Rights of Minors
The rights of minors present a special problem. Some of the adher-
ents of new religious groups are under the legal age of majority.
At common law, the age of majority is twenty-one, and that age
prevails in all but those states which have changed it by statute.' 5 In
New York, a "minor" or "infant," for most purposes, is anyone under
the age of eighteen.15 2 A minor cannot emancipate himself. The only
legal means for emancipation are through some act or omission on the
part of the parents,15 3 or through one of the statutes which create an
automatic emancipation upon the happening of a given event, e.g., a
marriage. 154
Traditionally, the religious training and upbringing of minor chil-
dren has been solely within the parents' control.' 5  The courts have
generally taken a position of noninterference with the right of the
parent to direct the religious upbringing of the minor child.' S6 It has
even been held that a court has no power to decree that children be
allowed to attend the church of their choice rather than the one
attended by the parent. 57
This does not necessarily mean that parents have always had the
right to interfere with their minor child's freedom of conscience. The
old case of In re Guertin's Childi 58 expresses the traditional limits of
parental authority:
If the parent should reach the conclusion that the attendance of his child upon the
149. See, e.g., People v. Murphy, No. 2012176, slip op. at 10-11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct- Mar. 16, 1977).
150. See notes 60-67 supra and accompanying text.
151. Jones v. Jones, 72 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1934); United States v. Flowers, 227 F. Supp.
1014 (W.D. Tenn. 1963), aff'd, 331 F.2d 604 (6th Cir. 1964); Sternlieb v. Normandie Nat'l Sec.
Corp., 263 N.Y. 245, 188 N.E. 726 (1934).
152. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 2 (McKinney 1977).
153. Murphy v. Murphy, 206 Misc. 228, 133 N.Y.S.2d 796 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Bates v. Bates,
62 Misc. 2d 498, 310 N.Y.S.2d 26 (Faro. Ct. 1970); Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 139 S.E.2d
753 (1965); Detwiler v. Detwiler, 162 Pa. Super. Ct. 383, 57 A.2d 426 (1948); Parker v. Parker,
230 S.C. 28, 94 S.E.2d 12 (1956).
154. Lawson v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 203 (W.D. Va. 1972); People v. Sherman, 9 111. App. 3d
547, 291 N.E.2d 865 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 57 Ill. 2d 1, 309 N.E.2d 562 (1974).
155. People ex rel. Portnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539, 544, 104 N.E.2d 895, 898 (1952).
156. Mester v. Mester, 58 Misc. 2d 790, 296 N.Y.S.2d 193 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Paolella v. Phillips,
27 Misc. 2d 763, 209 N.Y.S.2d 165 (Sup. CL 1960).
157. In re Guardianship of Faust, 239 Miss. 299, 123 So. 2d 218 (1960).
158. J Alas. 1 (1887).
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ministration of any particular religious instructor is not conducive to its welfare, lie
may prohibit such attendance, and confine it to such religious teachers as he may deem
most likely to give it proper instruction, and to secure its welfare here and its eternal
happiness in the world to come. He cannot force it to adopt opinions contrary to the
dictates of its own conscience. He may not compel it, against its own convictions of
right, to become a member of any religious denomination; but after it has been initiated
with its own free will into the religious communion to which its parent belongs, he
may lawfully restrain it during its legal infancy from placing itself under the religious
control of a minister or priest whose opinions do not meet its parent's approbation.
The authority of the parent over the youth and inexperience of his offspring rests on
foundations far more sacred than the institution of man.159
The law regarding the constitutional rights of minors is, however,
beginning to develop, and the day may come when parents can no
longer restrain their unemancipated children from associating with
members of a religious group they disapprove. Surely the parents will
continue to retain the right to keep their minor children from leaving
home to live in religious communes, but the widening recognition of
rights of minors may prohibit outright interference with freedom of
conscience.
Conscience and religious belief are fundamentally private matters,
and interference with them constitutes an interference with the devel-
oping right of privacy. In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 60 the
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a Missouri statute which
required the written consent of a parent before an abortion could be
performed on an unmarried woman under the age of eighteen. 161
Justice Blackmun stated: "Constitutional rights do not mature and
come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age
of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitu-
tion and possess constitutional rights.' 62
The Danforth case, as well as several other cases, 163 were based
upon the fundamental right of privacy. This was also the theory
behind a recent Supreme Court decision declaring unconstitutional the
New York statute which prohibited the sale of contraceptives to
minors. 164
159. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
160. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
161. Id. at 72-75.
162. Id. at 74.
163. Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd
sub nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901 (1976); Foe v. Vanderhoof, 389 F. Supp. 947 (D.
Colo. 1975); Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Ky. 1974), modified, 541 F.2d 523 (1976);
Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 950 (1973);
Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159 (Alas. 1972); State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260
(1975) (en banc).
164. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977).
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The logical extension of the principles of the Danforth and Carey v.
Population Services International1 65 cases is that although parents
may retain the right to regulate their minor children's religious up-
bringing, they may not invade the constitutional right of privacy by
inflicting "deprogramming" on their children, provided appropriate
state action is found. There is a substantial difference between reli-
gious guidance and heavyhanded methods of behavior modification.
IV. THE LEGALITY OF ABDUCTION
A. Criminal Cases
The book Let Our Children Go!,166 by deprogrammer Ted Patrick
with Tom Dulack, states:
[Dleprogramming is the term, and it may be said to involve kidnapping at the very
least, quite often assault and battery, almost invariably conspiracy to commit a crime,
and illegal restraint. Patrick disputes the charge that saving children from a cult
entails illegal behavior; in any event, he contends that no alternative e.xists.' 67
A principal reason police have often refused to take any action
against deprogrammers is that a family member is always involved. 68
To the police, this can make the affair a "family matter" which should
either be referred to the family courts or dealt with in civil courts. 16 9
The FBI has, at times, expressed similar views. 170
The federal kidnaping statute 71 applies to "[wihoever unlawfully
seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away
and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person, except in the
case of a minor by the parent thereof, when: (1) the person is willfully
transported in interstate or foreign commerce .... "172 The phrase "or
165. Id.
166. T. Patrick with T. Dulack, Let Our Children Go! (1976).
167. Id. at 63.
168. See, e.g., id. at 65.
169. See, e.g., id. at 140-45, 175.
170. One special agent of the FBI commented, "A father can't kidnap his own child." "Lote
Family" in New Mixup, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Mar. 13, 1974. at Ai, col. 4. The case the agent
referred to later resulted in a federal prosecution of Ted Patrick, the woman's abductor, for
kidnaping, though he was acquitted. N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1974, at 52, col. 3. The judge held that
parental abduction of their adult daughter was justified, and that Patrick as their agent received the
benefit of any defense the parents would have. T. Patrick with T. Dulack, Let Our Children Go!
202-03 (1976).
In 1973, the writer of this Article made repeated attempts to obtain FBI action against depro-
grammers. He was met with resistance and an attitude that such conduct by family members or
persons hired by them was not really criminal.
171. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201(a) (West Supp. 1977).
172. Id. (emphasis added).
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otherwise" means that federal law recognizes kinds of kidnapings
other than kidnaping for ransom. In most deprogramming cases, the
people being kidnaped are not minors,173 and therefore the defense
available to a parent does not come into play. Moreover, even if the
parent has the defense, it should not apply to nonfamily deprogram-
mers. 174 Nevertheless, there has been only one known federal prose-
cution under the kidnaping statute for an abduction for purposes of
deprogramming. 175
The obvious reason for this failure to prosecute is that the "purpose"
of the deprogramming-kidnaping is not one of the traditional purposes,
i.e., ransom, use as a hostage, white slavery, or sexual abuse. Federal
officials apparently have decided to pass over acts which may not fall
into the usual category of socially reprehensible conduct.
However, the Supreme Court has held that kidnaping within the
meaning of the federal statute need not be for pecuniary benefit or any
other illegal purpose. 176 Circuit courts have held that the kidnaping
need not be for ransom or reward, or some other illegal purpose, and
that a specific purpose need not be charged or proved in a kidnaping
case. 177 There is no requirement that the victim of a kidnaping be
harmed. 78 Under federal law, it is possible for a parent to be
convicted of kidnaping his or her own child where that child has a
legal right to freedom.1 79
In Miller v. United States,180 the mother and the stepfather of a
married seventeen-year-old girl abducted her for the purpose of forcing
her to live with them and work for them. Prior to her marriage, the
girl had lived with her grandfather. The court upheld the conviction of
the stepfather against the claim that he was simply aiding his wife in
assuming control of her daughter. l81
It is not a defense that the motive of the kidnaper is pure, or that
well-meaning persons have abducted a child for its own benefit. In
173. Editorial. Deprogramming and Religious Liberty, 29 Church & State 212, 212 (1976).
174. Cf Miller v. United States, 138 F.2d 258 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 803 (1944)
(stepfather may be prosecuted for kidnaping married seventeen-year-old step daughter).
175. United States v. Patrick, No. CR74-320S(W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 1974),appeal dismissed,
532 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1976).
176. United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75, 82 (1964); Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128
(1936).
177. Hall v. United States, 410 F.2d 653, 659-60 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 970 (1969);
Loux v. United States, 389 F.2d 911, 916 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 393 U.S. 867 (1968); United States
v. Bentley, 310 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1962).
178. De Herrera v. United States, 339 F.2d 587, 588 (10th Cir. 1964).
179. Miller v. United States, 138 F.2d 258 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 803 (1944).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 260-61.
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United States v. Atchinson, 182 the defendant had abducted a five-
year-old child in the belief that the child was being mistreated by its
parents. There was no evidence that the child was harmed by the
defendant, and, on the contrary, there was evidence that the defendant
was motivated by concern for the child's well-being. 183 The court
upheld a federal conviction for kidnaping, and a sentence of six years'
imprisonment.18 4
The degree to which abduction for the purpose of deprogramming
can be prosecuted under state law varies from state to state. Generally,
the common law crime of kidnaping has been expanded to include the
crime of false imprisonment. The elements of the crime depend upon
the particular wording of the statute. 185
As a general rule, one can be prosecuted for kidnaping, or un-
lawful imprisonment, without any proof that the act was performed
for financial gain or for some other illegal purpose. 186 The purpose of
the kidnaping is usually immaterial. 187 The purpose of the abduction
may serve as a factor of aggravation, 188 or may be used in determining
the punishment. 189 An evil intent may be specifically required for
prosecution on account of kidnaping.190 As to first degree kidnaping,
New York would appear to be such a state. 191
New York combines kidnaping and unlawful imprisonment under
the sbme article of the Penal Law. 192 The key terms are "restrain" and
"abduct." One is guilty of kidnaping if he "abducts" a person. 193 One
is guilty of unlawful imprisonment if he "restrains" another person. 194
182. 524 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1975).
183. Id. at 368.
184. Id. at 371.
185. State v. Evans, 72 Idaho 458, 462-64, 243 P.2d 975, 977-78 (1952).
186. See, e.g., State v. Tillotson, 85 Kan. 577, 117 P. 1030(191 1),appeal dismissed, 232 U.s 728
(1914).
187. State v. Taylor, 82 Ariz. 289, 294, 312 P.2d 162, 166 (1957); People v. Trawick, 78 Cal.
App. 2d 604, 606, 178 P.2d 45, 47 (3d Dist. 1947); State v. Wallace, 259 Iowa 765, 774, 145 N.W.2d
615, 621 (1966); McGuire v. State, 231 Miss. 375, 381, 95 So. 2d 537,540 (1957); State v. Berry, 200
Wash. 495, 516, 93 P.2d 782, 791 (1939).
188. E.g., State v. Rollins, 8 N.H. 550 (1837).
189. E.g., Arrington v. State, 3 Ga. App. 30, 59 S.E. 207 (1907).
190. State v. Weir, 506 S.W.2d 437 (Mo. 1974).
191. N.Y. Penal Law § 135.25 (McKinney 1975) requires death or evil intent as an element in
first degree kidnaping. See also N.Y. Penal Law § 135.00(2) (McKinney 1975). For second degree
kidnaping, however, there is no similar requirement. See N.Y. Penal Law § 135,20 (McKinney
1975).
192. N.Y. Penal Law §§ 135.00-.75 (McKinney 1975).
193. Id. §§ 135.20, .25.
194. Id. §§ 135.05, . 10. These terms are defined in § 135.00 of the Penal Law as follows: "1.
'Restrain' means to restrict a person's movements intentionally and unlawfully in such manner as to
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In New York there is a crucial distinction between "kidnaping" and
"unlawful imprisonment." It is the distinction between "genuine kid-
naping" and those many other types of abduction or restraint which
include lesser offenses against the rights of the unwilling victim. 195
It seems doubtful that the acts of deprogrammers would fulfill the
specific intent requirement of New York's first degree kidnaping
statute. 196 First degree kidnaping requires either death; or intent to
injure, sexually abuse, or terrorize a person, or to collect ransom,
advance a felony, or interfere with a governmental function. 197 Second
degree kidnaping, however, simply requires that the victim be ab-
ducted. 198 Although second degree kidnaping requires a criminal in-
tent, 99 it appears that intent to abduct is sufficient, without regard to
the motive. 200 Thus, a second degree kidnaping prosecution in New
York of those who abducted a person for deprogramming would
appear to be in order.
In any New York prosecution for kidnaping, it is an affirmative
defense that "(a) the defendant was a relative of the person abducted,
and (b) his sole purpose was to assume control of such person." '20 '
Hence, a New York kidnaping charge could not be successfully
brought against a person who abducted a relative for deprogramming.
The statutory defense does not extend, however, to unrelated abduc-
interfere substantially with his liberty by moving him from one place to another, or by confining him
either in the place where the restriction commences or in a place to which he has been moved, without
consent and with knowledge that the restriction is unlawful. A person is so moved or confined
'without consent' when such is accomplished by (a) physical force, intimidation or deception, or (b)
any means whatever, including acquiescence of the victim, if he is a child less than sixteen years old
or an incompetent person and the parent, guardian or other person or institution having lawful
control or custody of him has not acquiesced in the movement or confinement.
"2. 'Abduct' means to restrain a person with intent to prevent his liberation by either (a) secreting or
holding him in a place where he is not likely to be found, or (b) using or threatening to use deadly
physical force.
"3. 'Relative' means a parent, ancestor, brother, sister, uncle or aunt." N.Y. Penal Law § 135.00
(McKinney 1975).
195. See J. Zett, 8 N.Y. Criminal Practice $ 71.2[1] (1977); Commission Staff Comments on
Revised Penal Law, article 135, Gilbert Criminal Law and Procedure 2a-138 (1977).
196. N.Y. Penal Law § 135.25 (McKinney 1975).
197. Id. Intent to manipulate a third party's condut is also included. Id.
198. Id. § 135.20.
199. People v. Weiss, 252 App. Div. 463, 465, 300 N.Y,S. 249, 254 (2d Dep't 1937), rev'd on
other grounds, 276 N.Y. 384, 12 N.E.2d 514 (1938).
200. See N.Y. Penal Law § 135.20 note (McKinney 1975) (Practice Commentaries). "[Second
degree kidnaping] falls somewhat short of the behavior exclusively covered by the first degree offense
and should not be penalized as [first degree kidnaping, an A-I felony]." Id. The Practice Commen-
taries gives "child stealing by a love-starved woman" as an example of kidnaping that would sup-
port a second degree, but not a first degree, conviction. Id.
201. Id. § 135.30
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tors. In most states a parent cannot be charged with kidnaping his own
child.2 02 But where a parent does not have legal custody, he can be
guilty of kidnaping. 203
In New York, the less serious offense of unlawful imprisonment also
appears to be applicable to abduction for the purpose of deprogram-
ming. For unlawful imprisonment to constitute a first degree offense,
the restraint must expose the victim to a "risk of serious physical
injury. °20 4 This might apply if an abduction for deprogramming were
particularly violent. Second degree unlawful imprisonment occurs
when the defendant "restrains" another person.205
Ted Patrick has escaped conviction in New York for second degree
unlawful imprisonment of a person aged twenty.20 6 In a case involving
his attempt to abduct Daniel Voll for deprogramming, 207 Patrick
claimed he was only helping the parents of the young man save him
from an injury greater than the seizure of Voll. 208 He asserted the
justification defenses in sections 35.05(2) and 35.10(1) of the New York
Penal Law. 20 9
The first of these defenses, that in section 35.05(2),210 requires an
"cemergency situation" in which public or private injury is "immi-
nent." 211 Even if one accepts the dubious proposition that membership
in a particular religious group caused "injury," could such injury be
deemed "imminent" requiring emergency measures?212 The other jus-
202. Wilborn v. SuperiorCourt, 51 Cal. 2d828, 337 P.2d65 (1959); State v. Elliott, 171 La. 306,
131 So. 28 (1930); Biggs v. State, 13 Wyo. 94, 77 P. 901 (1904).
203. Wilborn v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 828, 337 P,2d 65 (1959); People v. Hyatt, 18 Cal.
App. 3d 618, 96 Cal. Rptr. 156(4th Dist. 1971); Hicks v. State, 158Tenn. 204. 12 S.W.2d 385(1928).
204. N.Y. Penal Law § 135.10 (McKinney 1975).
205. N.Y. Penal Law § 135.05 (McKinney 1975). Second degree unlawful imprisonment is a
class A misdemeanor. Id.
206. "Deprogrammer" Patrick Cleared, Wash. Post, Aug. 7, 1973, at A3, col. 7; see T. Patrick
with T. Dulack, Let Our Children Go! 167-68, 180 (1976).
207. People v. Patrick, No. N-320779 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Aug. 6, 1973).
208. T. Patrick with T. Dulack, Let Our Children Go! 167-68 (1976). One of V'oll's fingers was
dislocated in the struggle that ensued when Patrick and Voll's father attempted to abduct Voll.
Assault charges were initially filed against Patrick. Kaufman, Sating Your Children from Salation,
N.Y. Magazine, Apr. 16, 1973, at 55, 57-58. The judge later directed the jury to acquit Patrick on the
assault charge, as there was no evidence that Patrick, and not Vrol's father, was responsible for the
dislocated finger. Voll did not press charges against his father. See Patrick Trial Involves N.Y.
Official, Wash. Post, Aug. 3, 1973, at A3, col. 1.
209. Interview with Juan U. Ortiz, former assistant districtattorney, in New York City(Feb. 13,
1978); see Patrick Acquitted in Seizure of Youth, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1973, at 24, col. S.
210. N.Y. Penal Law § 35.05(2) (McKinney 1975).
211. People v. Brown, 70 Misc. 2d 224, 333 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Sup. CL 1972).
212. Section 35.02(2) of the New York Penal Law, which contains this justification defense, is
derived from § 3.02(lXa) of the Model Penal Code adopted by the American Law Institute. It is based
on the concept of "necessity," i.e., the avoidance of an evil greater than the evil sought to be
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tification defense, in section 35.10(1), allows a parent or someone else
assigned to care for a person under twenty-one to use physical force,
but not deadly physical force, as he reasonable believes it necessary for
the discipline or welfare of the young person. 213 Both of these jus-
tification defenses are general defenses which must be disproved
beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution. 214
At the time of this prosecution of Patrick, the age of majority in
New York was twenty-one, 215 and section 35.10(1) applied to the
parent of a "minor. '' 216 Since the attempt to abduct Voll occurred two
weeks prior to his twenty-first birthday, 217 he would have been
considered a minor unless emancipated. The prosecuting attorney,
Juan U. Ortiz, argued that Voll, who had been living on his own, was
emancipated. 2 18
The trial judge allowed the jury to get deeply involved in value
judgments about the rightness or wrongness of Voll's religion. 219 The
result was a trial of Voll's religion, rather than of Ted Patrick. The
defense was permitted to introduce wide-ranging evidence in an at-
tempt to ridicule the devoutly held beliefs of Voll's evangelical Protes-
tant fellowship. 220 No evidence was offered to show that this group
prevented by the law defining the offense charged. See Model Penal Code § 3.02(1)(a), at 45 (Proposed
Official Draft, 1962) ("imminent danger" means reasonable grounds for apprehending that injury is
aboutto occur). Thus, a defendant who claimed the plaintiff'was about to kill him was not justified in
shooting the plaintiff where plaintiff had broken the entrance door to the house, but defendant was
safe upstairs. Barbagallo v. Americana Corp., 32 App. Div 2d 622, 299 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1st Dep't),
modified on other grounds, 25 N.Y.2d 655, 254 N.E.2d 768, 306 N.Y.S.2d 466 (1969).
213. N.Y. Penal Law § 35.10(1) (McKinney 1975).
214. People v. Steele, 26 N.Y.2d 526, 528, 260 N.E.2d 527, 528, 311 N.Y.S.2d 889, 891
(1970); N.Y. Penal Law § 35.00 note (Practice Commentaries) (McKinney 1975).
215. See ch. 1030, 1965 N.Y. Laws (current version at N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law g" 2 (McKinney
1977)).
216. Ch. 1030, 1965 N.Y. Laws (amended 1974). The statute was subsequently amended to
substitute "a person under the age of twenty-one" for "a minor person." Act of June 15, 1974, ch.
930, § 1, 1974 N.Y. Laws (codified at N.Y. Penal Law § 35.10(1) (McKinney 1975)).
217. See Patrick Acquitted in Seizure of Youth, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1973, at 24, col. 5.
218. Interview with Juan U. Ortiz, former assistant distryct attorney, in New York City (Feb. 3,
1978).
219. See Voll Tells Kidnap Trial of His Conversion, N.Y. Post, July 26, 1973, at 22, col. 1.
220. See Religious "Deprogramming" at Issue in N. Y. Assault Trial, Wash. Post, July 30, 1973,
at A2, col. 1. At one point in the cross-examination of a defense witness, defense counsel objected to a
question as to the number of people Patrick had deprogrammed. The following exchange occurred
between the judge, Bruce Wright, and defense counsel: "[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I'm
going to object because I think we're going far afield to the specific issues in this case.
"THE COURT: When did you think we began to go far afield?
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I think probably in my opening.
"THE COURT: This is cross examination. I will allow it." Transcript of Proceedings pt. jury II, at
134, People v. Patrick, No. N-320779 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Aug. 6, 1973).
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was engaged in anything unlawful or even mildly improper.221 In-
stead, it was the fundamental theological beliefs and practices of the
group that came under the court's scrutiny.
The defense argued that Patrick, hired by Voll's parents, was their
agent, and should have the benefit of the general defenses under
section 35, if available to the parents, who were not on trial. The
prosecution argued that these were personal defenses and should not
apply to hired abductors-just as the defense of one conspirator does
not shield a co-conspirator. The judge, however, instructed the jury
that Patrick could claim those general defenses available to the par-
ents.22 2 Since these defenses must be disproved by the prosecution
beyond a reasonable doubt,223 extraordinary latitude is given to hired
assailants if the agency theory is accepted. Patrick was acquitted. 224
The application of the defense of justification under section 35.05(2)
of the New York Penal Law, requiring an emergency situation, to the
attempted abduction of Voll is a perversion of the intent of the New
York Legislature in enacting this section. The Temporary Commission
on the Revision of the New York Penal Law indicated that the section
should be narrowly construed so as to apply to areas of "technically
criminal behavior which virtually no one would consider improper." 225
Illustrative is the burning of real property to prevent a forest fire, or
confining a person to halt an epidemic. It does not justify such things
as mercy killings committed out of disagreement with "the "morality or
advisability of the law. ' ' 226 By logical extension, it does not apply to
221. See Patrick Acquitted in Seizure of Youth, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1973, at 24, col. S.
222. Interview with Juan U. Ortiz, former assistant districtattorney, in New York City (Feb. 13,
1978).
223. See note 214 supra and accompanying text.
224. Patrick Acquitted in Seizure of Youth, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1973, at 24, col. 5. Professor
Juan U. Ortiz, adjunct associate professor at Fordhan Law School, was the prosecuting attorney in
this case. He commented: "It was clear that [Voll's fellowship] was on trial. I was placed in the
position where I had to defend the fellowship. In fact, I felt more like a defense attorney than a
prosecutor .... I thought it was a fascinating case. I was outraged by this type of conduct [the
attempted abduction of Voll] and took a very personal interest in it .... I felt great sympathy with the
parents' position. But the fears of the parents were misplaced. I think that if the parents had known
the facts at the time of the trial, they would have testified for the prosecution. Even if the parents'
fears had been justified, Ted Patrick should not have been able to use those fears in his own
defense .... rm really proud and glad that I was the first one in the country to prosecute
Patrick-even though he was acquitted. This was a first step taken to protect the religious
freedom of targets of deprogramming." Interview with Juan U. Ortiz, former assistant district
attorney, in New York City (Jan. 27, 1978).
225. N.Y. Penal Law § 35.05 note (McKinney 1975) (Practice Commentaries) (emphasis added);
see People v. Brown, 70 Misc. 2d 224, 229, 333 N.Y.S.2d 342, 348-49 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
226. Commission Staff Notes to Proposed New York Penal Law § 65.00(2), Gilbert Criminal
Law and Procedure 2A-46 (1977); 7 J. Zett, New York Criminal Practice T 65.1[31, at 65-8 (1977).
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abductions committed out of disagreement with the "morality" or
advisability of the protection the first amendment provides to religious
practices carried out by an individual. Traditionally, the defense of
"justification" or "necessity" applied only where the defendant was
forced to act by reason of physical forces of nature rather than acts of
other human beings. 2
2 7
In the subsequent case of United States v. Patrick,228 a federal
district judge in the State of Washington, on a motion by the defen-
dant, dismissed kidnaping charges against Ted Patrick on a mixed
theory of "justification" and lack of criminal intent. 229 The court
seemed to ignore the fact that under the federal kidnaping statute
"motive" or "purpose" is not a defense, 230 and that in any event the
defenses available to a parent should not be available to the parent's
agent. 231
More recently, courts have begun to disallow the defense of jus-
tification in prosecutions for false imprisonment of a target of depro-
gramming. In Orange County, California, a court sentenced Ted Pat-
rick to a year in prison, with all but sixty days suspended, on account
of his false imprisonment of a member of the Hare Krishna sect.
232
227. w. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law § 50, at 381 (1972).
228. No. CR 74-320 S (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 1974), appeal dismissed, 532 F.2d 142 (9th Cir.
1976).
229. The charge was the kidnaping of Kathe Crampton from a religious commune called Love
Israel. The judge, Walter T. McGovern, held as follows:
"THE COURT: All right, it is indicated by both sides that the questions before the Court are as
follows:
"One, maya parent legally justify kidnapping an adult child upon necessity grounds here alleged.
"My answer to that is in the affirmative, that there is such a common law defense and I so find.
"Does the availability of the defense turn upon the paren;' mere belief that a set of circumstances
exist or, rather, must it be demonstrated that the circumstances in fact exist?
"My answer to that question is that the availability of the defense turns upon the parents'
reasonable cause to, and that they do in fact have sufficient belief to consider that the child, Kathe
Crampton, was in imminent danger.
"The parents who would do less than what Mr. and Mrs. Crampton did for their daughter Kathe
would be less than responsible, loving parents. Parents like the Cramptons here, have justifiable
grounds, when they are of the reasonable belief that their child is in danger, under hypnosis or drugs,
or both, and that their child is not able to make a free, voluntary, knowledgeable decision to stay
within the so-called community." Transcript of Proceedings at -- , United States v. Patrick, No.
CR 74-320 S (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11,1974), appeal dismissed, 532 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1976).
230. See discussion of federal kidnaping statute and defenses at notes 171-74 infra and accom-
panying text.
231. See note 174supra. See also Wilborn v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 828, 337 P.2d 65 (1959);
State v. Brandenberg, 232 Mo. 531, 134 S.W. 529 (1911) (di;putes between parents over custody of
their offspring).
232. T. Patrick with T. Dulack, Let Our Children Go! 267, 275-76 (1976).
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The court held, as a matter of law, that the defense of justification
could not be introduced at trial. 233
In Denver, Colorado, where Patrick was charged with false impris-
onment of two young women who were not then members of any
religious sect, 234 the appeals court affirmed the conviction 235 despite
Patrick's argument that there were sufficient facts presented at trial to
prove justification. 236 The appeals court noted that the proper proce-
dure for proving such a defense is to make an offer of proof, out of the
presence of the jury, and let the court rule whether such a defense is
available. 237 On the central question, the court ruled: "First, for the
'choice of evils' defense to be available there must be an imminent
public or private injury about to occur which requires emergency
action. See § 18-1-702(1), C.R.S. 1973. Here, there was no evidence of
such a situation .... ,,238
The defense of justification, or "choice of evils," is obviously im-
proper in such prosecutions for a violent crime against the person
like kidnaping, false imprisonment, assault, or one of the other possi-
ble crimes which might arise out of deprogramming. Aside from the
question of "emergency" or "imminence," there is the more central
question of "injury." As United States v. Ballard,2 39 Katz v. Superior
Court,240 and People v. Murphy24 1 make clear, it is beyond the
competence of the courts (including juries) to determine the truth or
falsity of any religious belief or practice. 242 To argue that a particular
religious practice causes mental "injury" to the young adherent is to
challenge the first amendment. Only where it can be shown (in camera)
that some other real injury such as fraud, assault, restraint, or
abduction has occurred should such a defense be allowed.
B. Conservatorship Proceedings: Kidnaping by Court Order
In an effort to avoid the civil and criminal pitfalls of their profes-
sion, deprogrammers have turned to conservatorship proceedings as a
233. See id. at 275.
234. Moore, Terror in Denver, Liberty, Mar./ Apr. 1975, at 8, 11. The women were raised in
strict Greek Orthodox homes, but had rejected that way of life for a more independent one. "We only
wanted to be independent," said one, "to live our own lives. They [their parents] wanted us to move
back into their homes and let them tell us what to do." Id. at 9. Patrick, in league with the women's
parents, attempted to deprogram the women. Both were over twenty-one years of age. Id. at 9-11.
235. People v. Patrick, 541 P.2d 320 (Colo. App. 1975).
236. Id. at 322.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
240. 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1st Dist. 1977).
241. No. 2012/76 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 16, 1977).
242. See notes 83-90 supra and accompanying text.
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means of legally gaining control over their victims. Conservatorship
proceedings are designed to preserve the property "of persons who are
unable to manage their own affairs . . . because of debilitating factors
which create a condition falling short of incompetency .... "243
Under the laws of most states, it would be impossible to have a
young person, enthralled by his new path to salvation, declared
incompetent or mentally ill. One would search in vain to find "brain-
washed zombies" listed in any of the standard texts on mental disor-
ders. Indeed, the things parents complain of most-renunciation of
worldly things, total dedication to the group or group leader, change in
personality, flat affect, serenity, and apparent rejection of family and
former friends-do not fit within any of the categories of mental
disease .244
Generally, the requirements for appointment of a guardian or com-
mittee and a judicial declaration of incompetence are a privation of
reasoning faculties, 245 or an inability to act with discretion in the
ordinary affairs of life. 24 6 In some states, it is necessary that a person
be declared legally insane before a guardianship can be imposed.
247
Generally, however, an inability to protect oneself or to manage one's
property will suffice. 2 4 8 Irrespective of the legal standard, however,
"incompetency" is a strong term carrying strong implications.
Not so with conservatorship. There the implication of mental illness
is substantially eliminated, and the onus of "incompetency" avoided. A
conservator can be appointed simply because the conservatee is unable
to manage his property by reason of some disabling factor, which need
not amount to incompetence or justify the imposition of a committee-
ship. 24 9
243. Recommendation ofN.Y. Law Revision Comm'n to the Legislature, 1971 N.Y. Laws 2338.
244. See American Psychiatric Ass'n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
5-13 (2d ed. 1968).
245. Parrish v. Peoples, 214 Minn. 589, 9 N.W.2d 225 (1943); In re Guardianship of
Blochowitz, 135 Neb. 163, 280 N.W. 438 (1938); In re Guardianship of Winnett, 112 Okla. 43,
239 P. 603 (1925).
246. Richardson v. Richardson, 217 Iowa 127, 250 N.W: 897 (1933); In re Estate of Johnson,
286 Mich. 213, 281 N.W. 597 (1938); Parrish v. Peoples, 214 Minn. 589, 9 N.W.2d 225 (1943); In
re Bearden, 86 S.W.2d 585 (Mo. App. 1935); Harrelson v. Flournoy, 229 Mo. App. 582, 78
S.W.2d 895 (1934); In re Guardianship of Blochowitz, 135 Neb. 163, 280 N.W. 438 (1938); In re
Keiser, 113 Neb. 645, 204 N.W. 394 (1925); Hagins v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 275 N.C. 90,
165 S.E.2d 490 (1969); In re Guardianship of Prince, 379 P.2d 845 (Okla. 1963).
247. Caple v. Drew, 70 Kan. 136, 78 P. 427 (1904); Harrelson v. Flournoy, 229 Mo. App. 582, 78
S.W.2d 895 (1935).
248. Inre Keiser, 113 Neb. 645, 204 N.W. 394 (1925);Inre Guardianship of Green, 125 Wash.
570, 216 P. 843 (1923).
249. See, e.g., In re Schnelle, 74 Misc. 2d 226, 227, 343 N.Y.S.2d 245, 247 (Sup. Ct. 1973); In re
Emerson, 73 Misc. 2d 322, 325-26, 341 N.Y.S.2d 390, 393 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
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Deprogrammers have seized upon this device to obtain court orders
giving them control over the target. There is now in circulation a
"Legal Deprogramming Kit" with forms entitled "Petition for Ap-
pointment of Temporary Guardian," "Order Appointing Temporary
Guardian for Junior Doe, Order Setting Hearing To Show Cause and
Injunction," and sample medical and other attachments.2so One psy-
chologist teamed up with two lawyers who specialize in such "legal"
deprogrammings to provide them with appropriate testimony.251 Once
the court order has been obtained, the target may be seized by a sheriff
and police, then turned over to deprogrammers.252
The psychiatric testimony offered in such proceedings can be of
somewhat dubious quality, drawing on the faith of the true believer in
deprogramming. 253 While the case of People v. AurphyZS4 was pend-
ing in the Supreme Court for Queens County, New York, the father of
one of the persons involved in the case attempted to have his adult
Hare Krishna son declared incompetent. This was not a conservator-
ship proceeding, but was similar in purpose. The psychiatrist who
testified on the father's behalf had observed the son, and stated that
the son's lack of signs of mental disorder was the firmest indication
that he was a victim of mind control. 25 5
New York's conservatorship statute25 6 is taken from the Uniform
Probate Code.25 7 Like most conservatorship statutes, it deals only with
the question of conserving the property of someone under a disabili-
ty.258 The civil rights of the person over whom the proceeding is
brought are specifically protected.25 9 Indeed, the very purpose of such
a proceeding is to avoid the interference with civil rights which might
250. Legal Deprogramming Kit, in American Civil Liberties Union, "Deprogramming" A Book
of Documents 139 (June 3, 1977).
251. Sage, The War on the Cults, Human Behavior, Oct. 1976, at 40, 46-48. The psychologist,
however, after being named as a defendant in a civil suit by the target of an unsuccessful depro-
gramming effort, took a position against deprogramming. Deprogrammers on the Defensive, 31
Church & State 16 (1978).
252. E.g., Sage, The War on the Cults, Human Behavior, Oct. 1976, at 40, 49.
253. Such testimony is usually given by a psychiatrist who has never examined the proposed
conservatee. See, e.g., Orlando v. Wizel, No. 77-2091, slip op. at 3 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 5, 1978). Were
there to be an examination, the target would have notice of the proceeding and might be able to
defend himself or escape. See notes 268-69 infra and accompanying text.
254. No. 2012/76 (N.Y. Sup. CL Mar. 16, 1977).
255. Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss Indictment, by Eugene Harley, at 10 tDec. 9,
1976), People v. Murphy, No. 2012/76 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 16, 1977).
256. N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law §§ 77.01-.41 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1977).
257. Uniform Probate Code §§ 5-401 to -431.
258. N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 77.01 (McKinney 1976).
259. Section 77.25(a) of the N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law (McKinney 1976) reads in part -A
conservatee shall not be deprived of any civil right solely by reason of the appointment of a
conservator, nor shall such appointment modify or vary any civil right of a conservatee .
1978]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
be encompassed in a declaration of incompetency or civil commitment.
In its legislative memorandum accompanying New York's conser-
vatorship statute, 260 the legislature stated:
The conservatorship procedure provides a flexible means for protecting the property of
persons with serious debility and gives the court the power to set limits upon the
authority of the conservator and to insure that the conservatee has an adequate
allowance for his personal needs. The civil rights of the conservatee are not affected.
The title to the conservatee's property remains in him and the conservatee has the
power to dispose of his property by will if he possesses the requisite testament
capacity. Adequate procedures are incorporated to protect the constitutional rights of
the person who is the subject of the proceeding.26
Parents and deprogrammers have obtained a number of orders of
temporary guardianship, or conservatorship, and have used the tem-
porary control gained over sect members as an opportunity to depro-
gram them.2 62 There has, however, been very little judicial discussion
of the legality of using conservatorship proceedings to strip a person of
the legal rights which would ordinarily protect him from deprogram-
ming.
The leading case on such use of conservatorship proceedings-the
first, and so far the only significant judicial analysis of this practice-is
Katz v. Superior Court.263 There, the California appellate court had to
rule upon the validity of temporary orders of conservatorship granted
by the lower court over several members of the Unification Church, all
over twenty-one years of age. 264 The California conservatorship stat-
ute in effect at the time the orders were granted2 6s provided that a
conservator could be appointed over a person "likely to be deceived or
imposed upon by artful or designing persons. ' '266 Lawyers for the
parents used this language to justify orders allowing them temporary
control over the unwilling "Moonies. ' 2 67 The case was unusual in that
the proposed conservatees were given notice of the proceedings and
allowed to present testimony in a hearing which lasted eleven days. 268
Generally, when an order of temporary conservatorship is sought for
260. Legislative Memorandum, 1972 N.Y. Laws 3290.
261. Id. (emphasis added).
262. See, e.g., notes 263-88 supra and accompanying text.
263. 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1st Dist. 1977).
264. Id. at 956 & n.1, 976, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 235 & n.1, 248.
265. See id. at 960 & n.5, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 237 & n.5.
266. Id. at 960 n.5, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 237 n.5 (citing Act of July 6, 1957, ch. 1902, § 1, 1957
Cal. Stats. 3306, as amended by Act of Aug. 16, 1972, ch. 988, § 3, 1972 Cal. Stats. 1798). This
language was deleted from the statute by an amendment effective July 1, 1977. Act of Sept. 29,
1976, ch. 1357, § 25, 1976 Cal. Stats. 5986.
267. 73 Cal. App. 3d at 972-73, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 245-46.
268. Court Will Resume Deprogramming Case, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1977, at 18, col. 1.
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purposes of deprogramming, the target is not notified, to prevent him
from mounting a successful defense or escaping. 269
The conservatorship statute in California permits the appointment
of a conservator "with or without notice as the court or judge may
require, upon a verified petition establishing good cause.12 7 0 Ex parte
conservatorship proceedings allowed under California law are similar
to those in certain other states.2 71 In ex parte proceedings, the parents
and deprogrammers can come into court with affidavits by cooperating
psychiatrists or psychologists, and obtain temporary power over the
sect member without any opportunity for the member to respond with
his or her own psychiatric evidence and personal testimony.2 7 2 Having
secured the temporary order, the deprogrammers will often achieve
victory, since it may take no more than a few days to deprogram
someone. In the Katz case, deprogramming began very soon after the
temporary conservatorship orders were granted by the lower court.2 73
Though the appellate court quickly moved to ban deprogramming,
two of the five young people renounced the Unification Church one
day after the appellate court's order was issued.27 4
The appellate court in Katz noted, "The [lower] court's orders
following the hearing . . . contain no findings of fact which would
disclose the ground or grounds on which the orders were based. 275
The court below had issued orders appointing conservators without
finding that the conservatees were insane, incompetent, or unable to
manage their own property.2 76 Apparently, it was enough for the
lower court that the young people had joined an unorthodox religious
sect, and that the parents were concerned about their welfare. The
judge stated:
It's not a simple case. As I said, we're talking about the very essence of life here,
269. See, e.g., Order Appointing Temporary Guardianship of the Person and Granting Powers
to the Petitioner, In re Guardianship of Seidenberg, No. 58547 (Md. Cir. Ct. Feb. 24, 1977). On the
request of the parent of the proposed ward, the records of the petition were sealed -until the Court
further directs." Request for Order Directing the Clerk of Court To Seal the Records, In re Guard-
ianship of Seidenberg, No. 58547 (Tfd. Cir. Ct. Feb. 24, 1977).
270. Cal. Prob. Code § 2201 (West Cure. Supp. 1977).
271. See, e.g., 1l. Ann. Stat. ch. 3, § 113 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977); Mass. Ann. Laws ch.
201, § 2 (Michie/Law. Co-op Curn. Supp. 1977); Miss. Code Ann. § 93-13-251 (1972).
272. See note 269 supra and accompanying text.
273. See Custody Rule Upheld for Moon Disciples, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1977, at 16, col. 1;
Around the Nation: Moon Church A dherents Talk to Deprogrammers, N.Y. Times,. Mar. 28, 1977, at
18, col. 6.
274. Two Members of Moon Church Quit After Talk with "Deprogrammers," N.Y. Times, Mar.
30, 1977, at A17, col. 1.
275. 73 Cal. App. 3d at 963, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 240.
276. Id., 141 Cal. Rptr. at 240.
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mother, father and children ... .This is the essence of civilization. [ ] The family unit
is a micro-civilization. That's what it is. [$] A great civilization is made of many, many
great families, and that's what's before this Court.
One of the reasons that I made this Decision, I could see the love here of a parent for
his child, and I don't even have to go beyond that.2 7 7
One clinical psychologist who had examined the members of the
Unification Church on behalf of their parents testified, in the words of
the court, that what she observed in them "did not fit into any class
under headings offered in a standard psychiatric and psychological
diagnostic and statistical manual. ' 278 She expressed her opinion that
members of the Unification Church were objects of coercive persuasion
by the Church. 279 A psychiatrist hired by the parents expressed a
similar view as to coercive persuasion, and seemed concerned about the
young people's change in "affects," their "limited ability towards
abstractions," and the influence apparently exerted on them by "an
outside authority. ' 280 A clinical psychologist who testified on behalf of
the proposed conservatees stated that all were normal based on the
tests he had conducted. These tests, he said, would reveal symptoms
found in prisoners of war, but did not show such symptoms in this
case. He specifically repudiated certain symptoms relied upon by the
parents' experts. 281
The court found that the orders of conservatorship should not have
been granted on the evidence, even if given the interpretation most
favorable to the parents. 282 It did not need to rest its determination on
this ground, however, because it held that the "likely to be deceived
• ..by artful and designing persons"' 283 language of the statute was too
vague to be used to remove an adult's freedom. 28 4 The court empha-
sized that statutes, whether civil or criminal, which interfere with
fundamental constitutional rights must be certain in their application:
As applied in the present case an individual seeking salvation through religion or
associating in a social or political cause cannot tell whether or not he will be placed in
the custody of another on charges that he has been deceived by artful and designing
persons. When such charges are laid, the court or jury in examining the precepts and
associates selected by the proposed conservatee has no better standards under which to
evaluate the latter's conduct. Finally, there may be severe inroads on the individual's
277. Id. at 963 n.8, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 240 n.8.
278. Id. at 978, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
279. Id. at 978-79, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
280. Id. at 976-77, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 248-49.
281. Id. at 980, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
282. Id. at 959, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
283. Id. at 960 n.5, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 237 n.5.
284. Id. at 970-71, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 244-45.
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freedom to practice his religion, and to associate with whom he pleases because of the
threat of proceedings such as this.28s
The court held that the granting of such conservatorship orders vio-
lated the church members' constitutional right to religious freedom. 286 It
noted that courts have no special competence to judge the validity or
invalidity of one's chosen religion, or the process by which one arrives at
this belief. 287 The statute at issue was totally inappropriate when
applied to matters of faith and belief:
Although the words "likely to be deceived or imposed upon by artful or designing
persons" may have some meaning when applied to the loss of property which can be
measured, they are too vague to be applied in the world of ideas. In an age of subliminal
advertising, television exposure, and psychological salesmanships, everyone is exposed to
artful and designing persons at every turn. It is impossible to measure the degree of
likelihood that some will succumb. In the field of beliefs, and particularly religious tenets,
it is difficult, if not impossible, to establish a universal truth against which deceit and
imposition can be measured. 288
The Katz case made plain the truly illegal nature of "legal depro-
gramming" through conservatorship proceedings. Nevertheless, depro-
grammers will surely continue in their attempts to use legally sanctioned
means to accomplish their goal.
C. A Response: Civil Suits by Deprogrammers' Targets
For many victims who seek redress after abduction by deprogram-
mers, criminal prosecution is too harsh a remedy. While they may wish to
prosecute deprogrammers, they may be unwilling to charge their parents
with criminal acts. Moreover, how do they get around the indifference of
police and prosecutors? In addition, those seized by court order cannot
press criminal charges. The solution may be bringing a civil tort action,
and seeking protective and injunctive orders.
At just about every stage of the deprogramming process there are acts
committed by the relatives, deprogrammers, and other participants
which could lead to civil liability. A number of actions have been com-
menced against such persons, 289 and judgments have been recov-
285. Id. at 970, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
286. Id. at 959, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
287. Id. at 985-87, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 254-55.
288. Id. at 970, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 244 (footnote omitted).
289. E.g., Parsons v. Parsons, No. 77-2932-T (D. Mass., filed Sept. 28, 1977); Bavis v.
McKenna, No. H77-793 (D. Md., filed May 20, 1977); Helander v. Patrick. No. 77 Civ. 2401
(S.D.N.Y., filedMay 16, 1977); Lofgren v. Von Wald, No. 4-77-115 (D. Minn., filed Mar. 25. 1977);
Walford v. Hughes, No. 76 3597 DWW (C.D. Cal., filed Nov. 18, 1976).
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ered. 290 Several actions are still in progress and awaiting trial. 291 While
parents may have a defense to criminal charges of kidnaping and false
imprisonment, there is generally no immunity to tort actions by their
offspring. 292
The act by which a victim of deprogramming is originally seized would
generally constitute an assault and battery293-sometimes a serious
one. 294 There may also be assault and battery at other times during the
ordeal. 295 The physical restraint imposed upon the unwilling victim
290. E.g., Peterson v. Sorlien, No. 727258(4th Dist. Minn. Dec. 5, 1977) (action for damages for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and for a protective injunction by Susan Peterson, a
member of a group called The Way of Minnesota, which resulted in damages against two depro-
grammers of $4,000 and $6,000); Helander v. Patrick, No. 15 9062 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 1976)
(Wendy Helander, a member of the Unification Church, granted $5,000 judgment against depro.
grammer Ted Patrick with the statement, "The modus operandi adopted by the defendant and his
associates--luring the plaintiff away from Unification Church premises by deception, attempting to
'deprogram' her by crude, callous, and brow-beating tactics, shifting her from place to place and
confining her against her will,--smacks more of a fictional television melodrama, rather than a
real-life incident." Id., slip op. at 2.)
291. See note 289 supra.
292. France v. A.P.A. Transport Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970); Howell v. Perrl, 60
Misc. 2d 871, 304 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351
(1971); see Wood v. Wood, 135 Conn. 280, 63 A.2d 586 (1948); Lancaster v. Lancaster, 213 Miss.
536, 57 So. 2d 302 (1952); Groh v. W.O. Krahn, Inc., 223 Wis. 662, 271 N.W. 374 (1973) (three
cases dealing with emancipated offspring); cf. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d
192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969) (parent allowed to bring a tort action against his offspring).
293. See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Tort-. §§ 9-10, at 34-41 (4th ed. 1971).
294. E.g., Ted Patrick's description of seizing Wes Lockwood for deprogramming: "Wes had
taken up a position facing the car, with his hands on the roof and his legs spread-eagled. There was no
way to get him inside while he was braced like that. I had to make a quick decision. I reached down
between Wes's legs, grabbed him by the crotch and squeezed--hard. He let out a howl, and doubled
up, grabbing for his groin with both hands. Then I hit, shoving him headfirst into the back seat of the
car and piling in on top of him." T. Patrick with T. Dulack, Let Our Children Gol 96 (1976).
295. The complaint in Lofgren v. Von Wald, No. 4-77-115 (D. Minn., filed Mar. 25, 1977)
contains the following allegations regarding the manner in which Nancy Dee Lofgren, a member of a
Christian fellowship, was treated during deprogramming: "23. While she was held in the Moller and
Amundson houses, Plaintiff, with the knowledge of and pursuant to the intentions of the other
Defendants, was subjected to 'deprogramming' by Defendants Margaret Moller, Kevin Morgel,
Audrey Moller, and Glen Amundson. During the 'deprogramming,' said Defendants subjected
Plaintiff to a constant barrage of abusive and obscene language, disgraceful and false accusations,
ridicule of her religious beliefs, physical assault, and threats that she would be kept a prisioner [sic]
and subjected to such treatment until she renounced her religion and adopted the religious beliefs
of the Defendants.
"24. At one point during Plaintiff's 'deprogramming,' Defendant Veronica Morgel picked Plain-
tiff up and dragged her about the room, while taunting her with obscene and humiliating statements.
Plaintiff did not consent to this physical assault on her person. Defendant Veronica Morgel forced
Plaintiff to stand until Plaintiff appeared to faint. On numerous other occasions Defendant
Veronica Morgel inflicted unconsented physical contact on Plaintiff.
"25. At one point in Plaintiffs 'deprogramming,' Defendant Kevin Morgel violently slapped
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would certainly constitute unlawful imprisonment. 296 The intense psy-
chological pressure placed upon the victim would constitute intentional
infliction of emotional distress, 297 particularly because it is accompanied
by false imprisonment and invasion of privacy. Some complaints charge a
separate tort of invasion of privacy. 29 8 Suits have also been brought
charging abuse of process 299 and medical malpractice 30 0 on account of
parents', deprogrammers', or medical personnels' participation in con-
servatorship or civil commitment proceedings.
The use by deprogrammers of conservatorship proceedings or other
civil actions such as a declaration of incompetency, appointment of a
guardian or committee, or habeas corpus, gives rise to the possibility that
the victim can bring an action under the federal civil rights statutes. 30 1
Plaintiff, inflicting a bloody nose and a cracked lip. On another occasion, Defendant Kevin Morgel
violently sat on Plaintiff's lap and blew his breath in her face.
"26. At one point in Plaintiff's 'deprogramming,' Defendant Audrey Moller attacked Plaintiff,
attempting to force open Plaintiff's eyes, dug her fingers into Plaintiff's neck, and forced her against a
piece of furniture in the Moller home." Complaint at 7.
296. See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 11 (4th ed. 1971). Complaints against
deprogrammers have charged assault, battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. E.g., Complaint at 18-19, 21, Parsons v. Parsons. No. 77-2932-TLD. MLass., filed
Sept. 28, 1977); Complaint at 18-19, Bavis v. McKenna, No. H77-793 (D. Md., filed May 20, 1977);
Complaintat 6-12, Helander v. Patrick, No. 77 Civ. 2401 (S.D.N.Y., filed May 16, 1977); Complaint
at 4-12, Lofgren v. Von Wald, No. 4-77-115 (D. M nn., filed M lar. 25, 1977); First Amended
Complaint at 8, Walford v. Hughes, No. 76 3597 DWW (C.D. Cal., filed Nov. 18, 1976).
297. W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 12. at 51-60(4th ed. 1971).
298. E.g., Complaint at 19-20, Parsons v. Parsons, No. 77-2932-T (D. Mass., filed Sept. 28,
1977); Complaint at 19, Bavis v. McKenna, No. H77-793 (D. Md., filed May 20, 1977); First
Amended Complaint at 8, Waiford v. Hughes, No. 76 3597 DWW (C.D. Cal., filed Nov. 18, 1976).
See generally W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 117, at 802-18 (4th ed. 1971).
299. E.g., Complaint at 20-21, Parsons v. Parsons, No. 77-2932-T (D. Mfass., filed SepL 28,
1977); Complaint at 17-18, Bavis v. McKenna, No. H77-793 (D. Md.. filed May 20, 1977).
300. E.g., Complaint at 11-12, Lofgren v. Von Wald, No. 4-77-115 (D. Minn., filed Mar. 25,
1977) (cause of action against medical director of mental institution for malpractice, negligent
supervision of his employees, and strict liability for his employees' torts; and against nurse and social
worker for medical malpractice); First Amended Complaint at 18-2 2, Nichols v. Galper, No, 402875
(Cal. Super. Ct., filed Aug. 16, 1977) (cause of action against clinical psychologist in charge of
deprogramming for medical malpractice with respect to the "treatment' accorded plaintiff by
persons under the psychologist's supervision, and for breach of duty to apprise the court granting the
conservatorship order of plaintiff's competency).
301. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983-1986(1970). Section 1983 gives a private right of action for deprivation of
rights under color of state law: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." Id. § 1983.
Sections 1985(2) and (3) allow for private redress against those who conspire to deprive a person of
the equal protection of the laws, or to thwart the course of justice or cause injury to bring about such
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This theory has been pleaded in a number of complaints against de-
programmers. 30 2 The concept revolves around the use of the courts
and court officers, including sheriffs, to accomplish a denial of the
plaintiff's basic rights to freedom of religion, association, privacy, and
speech.
Under section 1983, private parties may not be sued for acts which are
not performed "under color of law. '30 3 But where the private act is
performed pursuant to authority granted by state law30 4 or in collabora-
deprivation: "(2) ... If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force,
intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such
court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such
party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified, or to
influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to
injure such juror in his person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or Indictment
lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or having been such juror; or if two or more persons
conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due
course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the
laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any
person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws;
"(3) ... If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or
on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or
Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of
the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen
who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in
favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or its
a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of
such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons
engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy,
whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right
or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for
the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the
conspirators." Id. § 1985(2), (3).
Section 1986 makes liable those who know of such a wrong and could prevent it,but do not do so:
"Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned
in section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in
preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be
committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by
such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented; and such
damages may be recovered in an action on the case; and any number of persons guilty of such
wrongful neglect or refusal may be joined as defendants in the action ....... Id. § 1986.
302. Complaint at 2, Parsons v. Parsons, No. 77-2932-T (D. Mass., filed Sept. 28, 1977);
Complaint at 3, Bavis v. McKenna, No. H77-793 (D. Md., filed May 20, 1977); Complaint at 2,
Helanderv. Patrick, No. 77 Civ. 2401 (S.D.N.Y., filed May 16, 1977); Complaint at 1-2, Lofgren v.
Von Wald, No. 4-77-115 (D. Minn., filed Mar. 25, 1977); First Amended Complaint at 2, Walford v.
Hughes, No. 76 3597 DWW (C.D. Cal., filed Nov. 18, 1976).
303. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 754 (1966).
304. Scott v. Vandiver, 476 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1973).
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lion with state officials,305 a suit may be brought. Private detectives can
be sued under section 1983.306 Of course, police 307 and sheriffs308 can be
sued under section 1983, but not for executing court orders regular on
their face 309 or carrying out private pursuits outside the scope of official
duties. 310
Section 1985 permits actions against private persons for conspiracies
which involve no state action. 31' Under this theory, private conspirators
were subject to an action where they broke up a religious service, thereby
interfering with the congregation's freedom of religion. 312 Thus, the right
of action under section 1985(2) and (3) may be more accessible to plain-
tiffs than that under section 1983. 313
The New York Family Court Act confers jurisdiction on the family
court over actions constituting disorderly conduct, harassment,
menancing [sic], reckless endangerment, [and] an assault or an at-
tempted assault between spouses or between parent and child or
between members of the same family or household. '31 4 The court has
the power to issue an order of protection, 31s and violation of such an
305. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755-56 (1966); Grow v. Fisher, 523 F.2d 875,877 (7th
Cir. 1975); Fulton v. Emerson Elec. Co., 420 F.2d 527, 530 (5th Cir. 1969).
306. E.g., DeCarlo v. Joseph Home & Co., 251 F. Supp. 935 (W.D. Pa. 1966) (a statute gave
detectives a right to arrest which they would not have had at common law).
307. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976).
308. Hesselgesser v. Reilly, 440 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1971).
309. Haigh v. Snidow, 231 F. Supp. 324, 326 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
310. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945); Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d438, 440-41
(6th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 429 U.S. 118 (1976).
311. See, e.g., Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397,408 (2d Cir. 1975); Dry Creek Lodge, Inc
v. United States, 515 F.2d 926, 931 (10th Cir. 1975); Miles v. Armstrong, 207 F.2d 284, 256 (7th Cir.
1953).
312. Central Presbyterian Church v. Black Liberation Front, 303 F. Supp. 894 (E.D. Mo 1969)
313. In Orlando v. Wizel, No. 77-2091 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 5, 1978), a civil rights action brought
under § 1983 against parents and those who assisted them in their attempt to gain custody of their
adult offspring for deprogramming, the complaint was dismissed. The court held that the depro-
grammer, parents' attorneys, and psychiatrists, on whose affidavits the ex parte custody orders were
issued, were not acting under color of state law. Id., slip op. at 4-5. The court also noted that the state
judge who issued the ex parte custody orders was not acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction and
was immune from suit. Id. at 7-9. Since the Arkansas state police officer who took custody of the
young people pursuant to the state judge's order no longer had custody, the action for injunctive relief
sought against him was dismissed as moot. Id. at 10. The plaintiffs had not -Ought money damages
against the officer, since they believed he acted in good faith. Id. Plaintiffs did not plead a cause of
action under § 1985, however. Id. at 1. Furthermore, they were never actually subjected to
deprogramming. Id. at 3. At the time the plaintiffs brought this action in federal district court, the
guardianship orders issued against plaintiffs were under consideration by the Arkansas Supreme
Court, which had stayed these orders. Id. at 9. Hence, several factors make this case a unique one.
314. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 812 (McKinney Supp. 1977). This jurisdiction is exclusive when a
child under 18 is involved; otherwise criminal court jurisdiction is also available Id
315. Id. §§ 841(d), 842 (McKinney 1975).
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order is contempt of court. 316 A number of other states have family or
domestic relations courts with similar powers. 317
V. CONCLUSION
Deprogrammers have received much favorable publicity in the
media, 318 and from all appearances have a thriving business. They do not
oppose the principle of religious liberty, they say, but merely want to
make sure that everyone has the opportunity to espouse beliefs which
they consider acceptable--even if that means holding persons against
their wills and forcing them to listen. Many people have persuaded
themselves that to accept or condone deprogramming is not inconsistent
with upholding religious liberty, or liberty in general. Sensibilities which
would be quickly aroused if "religious freaks" were not involved have
been lulled into complacency by the strong accusations leveled against
targeted groups-even though these accusations remain substantially or
totally unproven.
Abandoning legal protections for a particular segment of society whose
beliefs are disapproved is a dangerous experiment. Deprogramming has
been used to change not only religious beliefs, but also political31 9 and
social attitudes. 320 A powerful weapon is being formed which can render
anyone with a relative who opposes his lifestyle vulnerable to a judicial
determination as to whether he can continue it-even though he is a
peaceable citizen who has broken no laws. Can we afford to say nothing
when we see young people being stuffed into cars, locked up in motel
rooms, accused, and manhandled because they will not espouse the goals
of society at large?
The responsibility for answering this question has largely fallen to the
courts. Some courts have said yes, violence may be used to break a
religious affiliation perceived as mentally injurious. Others have con-
demned illegal means used by deprogrammers. Fortunately, the most
recent judicial decisions have rejected the claims of justification asserted
by the deprogrammers, and have vindicated the constitutional right to
practice the religion of one's choice-however unorthodox it may seem to
others.
316. Id. § 846.
317. See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 93-15-1 (1972); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:2-9 (1976); S.C. Code
§ 20-11-40 (1976); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 48.40-.43 (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
318. See, e.g., Black, The Secrets of the Innocents: Why Kids Join Cults, Woman's Day, Feb.
1977, at 91; Edwards, Rescue from a Fanatic Cult, Reader's Digest, Apr. 1977, at 129, condensed
from Medical Economics, Nov. 1, 1976.
319. See 19-Year-Old Member of Marxist Unit "Deprogramed" and in Parents' Care, N.Y.
Times, July 27, 1974, at 59, col. 1.
320. See Phillips, The Deprogrammer, Christian Life, Nov. 1974, at 44, 54, 56 (Greek women
who sought to break from Greek tradition).
